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Abstract
We provide a general framework for the analysis of the dynamics of institutional change (e.g., de-
mocratization, extension of political rights or repression of di¤erent groups), and how these dynamics
interact with (anticipated and unanticipated) changes in the distribution of political power and in eco-
nomic structure. We focus on the Markov Voting Equilibria, which require that economic and political
changes should take place if there exists a subset of players with the power to implement such changes
and who will obtain higher expected discounted utility by doing so. Assuming that economic and political
institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political
power satisfy natural single crossing (increasing di¤erences) conditions, we prove the existence of a
pure-strategy equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative
static results that apply at this level of generality. We then use this framework to study the dynamics
of political rights and repression in the presence of radical groups that can stochastically grab power.
We characterize the conditions under which the presence of radicals leads to repression (of less radical
groups), show a type of path dependence in politics resulting from radicals coming to power, and identify
a novel strategic complementarity in repression.
Keywords: Markov Voting Equilibrium, dynamics, median voter, stochastic shocks, extension of
franchise, repression.
JEL Classication: D71, D74, C71.
An earlier draft was circulated under the title Markov Voting Equilibria: Theory and Applications. We
thank participants of Wallis Institute Annual Conference, CIFAR meeting in Toronto, and of seminars at George-
town, ITAM, Northwestern, London School of Economics, Stanford, UPenn, Warwick and Zurich for helpful
comments.
1 Introduction
Political change often takes place in the midst of uncertainty and turmoil, which sometimes
brings to power  or paves the road for the rise of  the most radical factions, such as the
militant Jacobins during the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution or the Nazis during the
crisis of the Weimar Republic. The possibility of extreme outcomes is of interest not only
because the resulting regimes have caused much human su¤ering and powerfully shaped the
course of history, but also because, in many episodes, the fear of such radical extremist regimes
has been one of the drivers of repression against a whole gamut of opposition groups. The events
leading up to the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia illustrate both how an extremist fringe
group can ascend to power, and the dynamics of repression partly motivated by the desire of
ruling elites to prevent the empowerment of extremist  and sometimes also of more moderate
 elements.
Russia entered the 20th century as an absolute monarchy, but started a process of limited
political reforms in response to labor strikes and civilian unrest in the aftermath of its defeat in
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Despite the formation of political parties (for the rst time
in Russian history) and an election with a wide franchise, the repression against the regimes
opponents continued, and the parliament, the Duma, had limited powers and was considered
by the tsar as an advisory rather than legislative body (Pipes, 1995). The tsar still retained
control, in part relying on repression against the leftist groups, his veto power, the right to
dissolve the Duma, full control of the military and cabinet appointments, and his ability to
rule by decree when the Duma was not in session. This may have been partly motivated by
the fear of further strengthening the two major leftist parties, Social Revolutionaries and Social
Democrats (corresponding to communists, consisting of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks),
which together controlled about 2/5 of the 1906 Duma and explicitly targeted a revolution.1
World War I, which became very unpopular following large casualties and territorial losses,
created the opening for the Bolsheviks, bringing to power the Provisional Government in the
February Revolution of 1917, and then later, the moderate Social Revolutionary Alexander
1Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democrats, recognized that a revolution was possible
only by exploiting turmoil. In the context of the 1906 Duma, he stated: Our task is [. . . ] to use the conicts
within this Duma, or connected with it, for choosing the right moment to attack the enemy, the right moment for
an insurrection against the autocracy.Later, he argued: [. . . ] the Duma should be used for the purposes of the
revolution, should be used mainly for promulgating the Partys political and socialist views and not for legislative
reforms,which, in any case, would mean supporting the counter-revolution and curtailing democracy in every
way.
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Kerensky. Additional military defeats of the Russian army in the summer of 1917, the destruc-
tion of the military chain of command by Bolshevik-led soldier committees, and Kerenskys
willingness to enter into an alliance with Social Democrats to defeat the attempted coup by the
army during the Kornilov a¤air strengthened the Bolsheviks further. Though in the elections
to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, they had only a small fraction of the vote, the
Bolsheviks successfully exploited their control of Petrograd Soviets to outmaneuver the more
popular Social Revolutionaries, rst entering into an alliance with so-called Left Social Revo-
lutionaries, and then coercing them to leave the government so as to form their own one-party
dictatorship.
This episode thus illustrates both the possibility of a series of transitions bringing to power
some of the most radical groups and the potential implications of the concerns of moderate
political transitions further empowering radical groups. Despite a growing literature on political
transitions, the issues we have just illustrated in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution can-
not be studied with existing models,2 because they necessitate a dynamic model where several
groups can form temporary coalitions and a rich set of stochastic shocks creates a changing
environment, potentially leading to a sequence of political transitions away from current power-
holders. Such a model could also shed further light on key questions in the literature on regime
transitions, including those concerning political transitions with several heterogeneous groups,
gradual enfranchisement, and the interactions between regime dynamics and coalition forma-
tion. In this paper, we develop a framework for the study of dynamic political economy in the
presence of stochastic shocks and changing environments, which we then apply to an analysis
of the implications of potential shifts of power to radical groups during tumultuous times. The
next example provides a rst glimpse of the type of abstraction we will use.
Example 1 Consider a society consisting of n groups, spanning from  l < 0 (left-wing) to
r > 0 (right-wing), with group 0 normalized to contain the median voter. For concreteness,
suppose that n = 3, and that the rightmost player corresponds to the Russian tsar, the middle
player to moderate groups, and the leftmost group to Bolsheviks. The stage payo¤ of each group
depends on current policies, which are determined by the politically powerful coalition in the
current political state. Suppose that there are 2n   1 political states, each state specifying
2These types of political dynamics are not conned to episodes in which extreme left groups might come to
power. The power struggles between secularists and religious groups in Turkey and more recently in the Middle
East and North Africa are also partly motivated by concerns on both sides that political power will irrevocably
 or at least persistently  shift to the other side.
2
which of the extremeplayers are repressed and excluded from political decision-making. With
n = 3, the ve states are s = 2 (both moderates and Bolsheviks are repressed and the tsar is the
dictator), 1 (Bolsheviks are repressed), 0 (nobody is repressed and power lies with moderates),
 1 (the tsar is repressed or eliminated), and nally  2 (the tsar and moderates are repressed, i.e.
a Bolshevik dictatorship). Since current policies depend on the political state, we can directly
dene stage payo¤s as a function of the current state for each player, ui(s) (which is inclusive
of repression costs, if any). Suppose that starting in any state s 6=  2, a stochastic shock can
bring the Bolsheviks to power and this shock is more likely when s is lower.
In addition to proving the existence and characterizing the structure of pure-strategy equi-
libria, our framework enables us to establish the following types of results. First, in the absence
of stochastic shocks bringing Bolsheviks to power, s = 0 (no repression or democracy) is stable
in the sense that moderates would not like to initiate repression, but s > 0 may also be stable,
because the tsar may prefer to incur the costs of repression to implement policies more in line
with his preferences. Second, and more interestingly, moderates may also initiate repression
starting with s = 0 if there is the possibility of a switch of power to Bolsheviks. Third, and
paradoxically, the tsar may be more willing to grant political rights to moderates when Bol-
sheviks are stronger, because this might make a coalition between the latter two groups less
likely (this is an illustration of what we refer to as slippery slopeconsiderations and shows the
general non-monotonicities in our model: when Bolsheviks are stronger, the tsar has less to fear
from the slippery slope). Fourth, there is history dependence in the sense that once Bolsheviks
come to power and leave power, a new (di¤erent) stable state may emerge. Finally, there is
strategic complementarity in repression: the anticipation of repression by Bolsheviks encourages
repression by moderates and the tsar.3
Though stylized, this example communicates the complex strategic interactions involved in
dynamic political transitions in the presence of stochastic shocks and changing environments.
Against this background, the framework we develop will show that, under natural assumptions,
we can characterize the equilibria of this class of environments fairly tightly and perform com-
parative statics, shedding light on these and a variety of other dynamic strategic interactions.
3This result is also interesting as it provides a new perspective on why repression may di¤er markedly across
societies. For example, Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution repressed the leftists, and after the Bolshevik
Revolution systematically repressed the rightists and centrists, while the extent of repression of either extreme
has been more limited in the United Kingdom. Such di¤erences are often ascribed to di¤erences in political
culture. Our result instead suggests that (small) di¤erences in economic interests or political costs of repression
can lead to signicantly di¤erent repression outcomes.
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Formally, we consider a generalization of the environment discussed in the example. Society
consists of i = 1; 2; :::; n players (groups or individuals) and s = 1; 2; :::;m states, which represent
both di¤erent economic arrangements with varying payo¤s for di¤erent players, and di¤erent
political arrangements and institutional choices. Stochastic shocks are modeled as stochastic
changes in environments, which contain information on preferences of all players over states and
the distribution of political power within states. This approach is general enough to capture a
rich set of permanent and transitory (as well as both anticipated or unanticipated) stochastic
shocks depending on the current state and environment. Players care about the expected dis-
counted sum of their utility, and they make joint choices among feasible political transitions,
based on their political power. Our key assumption is that both preferences and the distribution
of political power satisfy a natural single-crossing (increasing di¤erences) property: we assume
that players and states are ordered,and higher-indexed players relatively prefer higher-indexed
states and also tend to have greater political power in such states. (Changes in environments
shift these preferences and distribution of political power, but maintain increasing di¤erences).
Our notion of equilibrium is Markov Voting Equilibrium (MVE), which comprises two nat-
ural requirements: (1) that changes in states should take place if there exists a subset of players
with the power to implement them and who will obtain higher continuation utility (along the
equilibrium path) by doing so; (2) that strategies and continuation utilities should only depend
on payo¤-relevant variables and states. Under these assumptions, we establish the existence of
pure-strategy equilibria. Furthermore, we show that the stochastic path of states in any MVE
ultimately converges to a limit state  i.e., to a state that does not induce further changes once
reached, though this limit state may depend on the exact timing and sequence of shocks (Theo-
rems 1 and 3).4 Although MVE are not always unique, we also provide su¢ cient conditions that
ensure uniqueness (Theorems 2 and 4). We further demonstrate a close correspondence between
these MVE and the pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria of our environment (Theorem 5).
Despite the generality of the framework described here and the potential countervailing forces
highlighted by our example above, we also establish a number of comparative static results. Here
we only mention one of them. Consider a change in environment which leaves preferences or
the allocation of political power in any of the states s = 1; :::s0 unchanged, but potentially
changes them in states s = s0 + 1; :::;m. The result is that if the steady state of equilibrium
4This last result also implies that, in contrast to many other models of institutional persistence, ours features
true path dependence as dened, for example, by Page (2006), who criticizes many existing models of path
dependencefor being invariant to the sequencing of shocks.
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dynamics described above, x, did not experience change (i.e., x  s0), then the new steady state
emerging after the change in environment can be no smaller than this steady state (Theorem
6). Intuitively, before the change, a transition to any of the smaller states s  x could have
been chosen, but was not. Now, given that preferences and political power did not change for
these states, they have not become more attractive.5 An interesting and novel implication of
this result is that in some environments, there may exist critical states, such as a su¢ ciently
democratic constitution, and if these critical states are reached before the arrival of certain
major shocks or changes (which might have otherwise led to their collapse), there will be no
turning back (see Corollary 1). This result provides a di¤erent interpretation of the durability
of certain democratics regimes than the approaches based on democratic capital(e.g., Persson
and Tabellini, 2009): a democracy will survive forever if it is not shocked or challenged severely
while still progressing towards the su¢ ciently democratic constitution/state, but will fall if
there is a shock before this state is reached.
The second part of the paper applies our framework to the emergence and implications of
radical politics. After establishing that our framework and comparative statics can be directly
applied to the class of problems described in Example 1, we derive a number of additional results
for this application, some of which were outlined above.
Our paper is related to a large political economy literature. First, our previous work, in
particular Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2012), takes one step in this direction by introducing
a model for the analysis of the dynamics and stability of di¤erent political rules and constitutions.
However, that approach not only heavily relies on deterministic and stationary environments
(thus ruling out changes in political power or preferences) but also focuses on environments in
which the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to 1 so that all agents just care about the payo¤
from a stable state (that will emerge and persists) if such a state exists. Here, in contrast, it is
crucial that political change and choices are motivated by the entire path of payo¤s.6
Second, several papers on dynamic political economy and on dynamics of clubs emerge as
5 In contrast, some of the higher-ranked states may have become more attractive, which may induce a transition
to a higher state. In fact, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, transition to a state s  s0 + 1 can take place even if
all states s = s0 + 1; :::;m become less attractive for all agents in society.
6 In Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2010), we studied political selection and government formation in a popula-
tion with heterogeneous abilities and allowed stochastic changes in the competencies of politicians. Nevertheless,
this was done under two assumptions, which signicantly simplied the analysis and made it much less applica-
ble. In particular, stochastic shocks were assumed to be very infrequent and the discount factor was taken to be
close to 1. Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2011) took a rst step towards introducing stochastic shocks, but only
conned to the exogenous emergence of new extreme states (and without any of the general characterization or
comparative static results presented here).
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special cases of our paper. Among these, Roberts (1999) deserves special mention as an im-
portant precursor of our analysis. Roberts studies a dynamic model of club formation in which
current members of the club vote about whether to admit new members or exclude some of the
existing ones. Roberts focuses on a limited set of transitions, also makes single-crossing type
assumptions and only considers non-stochastic environments and majoritarian voting (see also
Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev, 2001, for a related setup). Both our framework and characteri-
zation results are more general, not only because they incorporate stochastic elements and more
general distributions of political power, but also because we provide conditions for uniqueness,
convergence to steady states, and general comparative static results. In addition, Gomes and
Jehiels (2005) paper, which studies dynamics in a related environment with side transfers, is
also noteworthy. This paper, however, does not include stochastic elements or similar general
characterization results either. Strulovici (2010), who studies a voting model with stochastic
arrival of new information, is also related, but his focus is on information leading to ine¢ cient
dynamics, while changes in political institutions or voting rules are not part of the model.
Third, our motivation is also related to the literature on political transitions. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000a, 2001) consider environments in which institutional change is partly motivated
by a desire to reallocate political power in the future to match the current distribution of power.7
Acemoglu and Robinsons analysis is simplied by focusing on a society consisting of two social
groups (and in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, with three social groups). In Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), Fearon (2004), Powell (2006), Hirshleifer, Boldrin and Levine (2009), and
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010), anticipation of future changes in political power leads
to ine¢ cient policies, civil war, or collapse of democracy. There is a growing literature that
focuses on situations where decisions of the current policy makers a¤ect the future allocation of
political power (see also, Besley and Coate, 1998).
Fourth, there is a small literature on strategic use of repression, which includes Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000b), Gregory, Schroeder, and Sonin (2011) and Wolitzky (2011). In Wolitzky
(2011), di¤erent political positions (rather than di¤erent types of players) are repressed in order
to shift the political equilibrium in the context of a two-period model of political economy. In
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), repression arises because political concessions can be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness. None of the papers discussed in the previous three paragraphs
7Other related contributions here include Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005), Barberà and Jackson (2004),
Messner and Polborn (2004), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Burkart and Wallner (2000), Jack and Laguno¤
(2008), Laguno¤ (2006), and Lizzeri and Persico (2004).
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study the issues we focus on or make progress towards a general framework of the sort presented
here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our general framework
and introduce the concept of MVE. Section 3 contains the analysis of MVE. We start with the
stationary case (without shocks), then extend the analysis to the general case where shocks are
possible, and then compare the concepts of MVE to Markov Perfect Equilibrium in a properly
dened dynamic game. We also establish several comparative static results that hold even at
this level of generality; this allows us to study the societys reactions to shocks in applied models.
Section 4 applies our framework to the study of radical politics. Section 5 discusses a number of
extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 General Framework
Time is discrete and innite, indexed by t  1. The society consists of n players (representing
individuals or groups), N = f1; : : : ; ng. The set of players is ordered, and the order reects
the initial distribution of some variable of interest. For example, higher-indexed players may
be richer, or more pro-authoritarian, or more right-wing on social issues. In each period, the
society is in one of the h environments E = fE1; : : : ; Ehg, which determine preferences and the
distribution of political power in society (as described below). We model stochastic elements
by assuming that, at each date, the society transitions from environment E to environment E0
with probability  (E;E0). Naturally,
X
E02E  (E;E
0) = 1. We assume:
Assumption 1 (Ordered Transitions) If 1  x < y  h, then
 (Ey; Ex) = 0.
Assumption 1 implies that there can only be at most a nite number of shocks. It also stipu-
lates that environments are numbered so that only transitions to higher-numbered environments
are possible.8 Though this is without loss of generality, it enables us to use the convention that
once the last environment, Eh, has been reached, there will be no further stochastic shocks.9
We model preferences and the distribution of political power by means of states, belonging
to a nite set S = f1; : : : ;mg.10 The set of states is ordered : loosely speaking, this will generally
8Assumption 1 does not preclude the possibility that the same environment will recur several times. For
example, the possibility of q transitions between E1 and E2 can be modeled by setting E3 = E1, E4 = E2, etc.
9This does not mean that the society must reach Eh on every path: for example, it is permissible to have three
environments with  (E1; E2) =  (E1; E3) > 0, and all other transition probabilities equal to zero.
10The implicit assumption that the set of states is the same for all environments is without any loss of generality.
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imply that higher-indexed states provide both greater economic payo¤s and more political power
to higher-indexed players. An example would be a situation in which higher-indexed states
correspond to more non-democratic arrangements, which are both economically and politically
better for richer, more elite groups. The payo¤ of player i 2 N in state s 2 S and environment
E 2 E is uE;i (s).
To capture relative preferences and power of players in di¤erent states, we will frequently
make use of the following denition:
Denition 1 (Increasing Di¤ erences) Vector fwi (s)gs2Bi2A , where A;B  R, satises the
increasing di¤erences condition if for any agents i; j 2 A such that i > j and any states x; y 2 B
such that x > y,
wi (x)  wi (y)  wj (x)  wj (y) .
The following is one of our key assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Increasing Di¤ erences in Payo¤ s) In every environment E 2 E, the
vector of utility functions, fuE;i (s)gs2Si2N , satises the increasing di¤erences condition.
Note that payo¤s fuE;i (s)g are directly assigned to combinations of states and environments.
An alternative would be to assign payo¤s to some other actions, e.g., policies, which are then
determined endogenously by the same political process that determines transitions between
states. This is what we do in Section 4, and as our analysis there shows, under fairly weak
conditions, the current state will determine the choice of action (policy), so payo¤s will then be
indirectly dened over states and environments. Here we are thus reducing notation by directly
writing them as fuE;i (s)g.
We model the distribution of political power in a state using the notion of winning coalitions.
This captures information on which subsets of agents have the (political) power to implement
economic or political change, here corresponding to a transition from one state to another. We
denote the set of winning coalitions in state s and environment E by WE;s, and impose the
following standard assumption:
Assumption 3 (Winning Coalitions) For environment E 2 E and state s 2 S, the set of
winning coalitions WE;s satises:
1. (monotonicity) if X  Y  N and X 2WE;s, then Y 2WE;s;
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2. (properness) if X 2WE;s, then N nX =2WE;s;
3. (decisiveness) WE;s 6= ?.
The rst part of Assumption 3 states that if some coalition has the capacity to implement
change, then a larger coalition also does. The second part ensures that if some coalition has
the capacity to implement change, then the coalition of the remaining players (its complement)
does not (e¤ectively ruling out submajority rule). Finally, the third part, in the light of
monotonicity propery, is equivalent to N 2 WE;s, and thus states that if all players want to
implement a change, they can do so. Several common models of political power are special
cases. For example, if a player is a dictator in some state, then the winning coalitions in that
state are all those that include him; if we need unanimity for transitions, then the only winning
coalition is N ; if there is majoritarian voting in some state, then the set of winning coalitions
consists of all coalitions with an absolute majority of the players.
Assumption 3 puts minimal and natural restrictions on the set of winning coalitions WE;s
in each given state s 2 S. Our main restriction on the distribution of political power will be,
as discussed in the Introduction, the requirement of some monotonicityof political power 
that higher-indexed players have no less political power in higher-indexed states. To formally
formulate this restriction, we need the notion of a quasi-median voter (see Acemoglu, Egorov,
and Sonin, 2012).
Denition 2 (Quasi-Median Voter) Player ranked i is a quasi-median voter (QMV) in
state s (in environment E) if for any winning coalition X 2WE;s, minX  i  maxX.
Let ME;s denote the set of QMVs in state s in environment E. Then by Assumption 3,
ME;s 6= ? for any s 2 S and E 2 E ; moreover, the set ME;s is connected: whenever i < j < k
and i; k 2 ME;s, j 2 ME;s. In many cases, the set of quasi-median voters is a singleton,
jME;sj = 1. Examples include: one player is the dictator, i.e., X 2 WE;s if and only if i 2 X
(and then ME;s = fig), or majoritarian voting among sets containing odd numbers of players,
or there is a weighted majority in voting with generic weights (see Section 4). An example
where ME;s is not a singleton is the unanimity rule.
The following assumption ensures that the distribution of political power is monotoneover
states.
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Assumption 4 (Monotone Quasi-Median Voter Property, MQMV) In any environ-
ment E 2 E, the sequences fminME;sgs2S and fmaxME;sgs2S are nondecreasing in s.
The essence of Assumption 4 is that political power (weakly) shifts towards higher-indexed
players in higher-indexed states. For example, if a certain number of higher-indexed players are
powerful enough to implement a transition in some state, then they are also su¢ ciently powerful
to do so in a higher-indexed state. This would hold in a variety of applications, including the
one we present in Section 4 and Robertss (1999) model. Trivially, ifME;s is a singleton in every
state, it is equivalent toME;s being nondecreasing (whereME;s is treated as the single element).
For some applications, one might want to restrict feasible transitions between states that
the society may implement; for example, it might be realistic to assume that only transitions
to adjacent states are possible. To incorporate such possibilities, we introduce the mapping
F = FE : S ! 2S , which maps every x 2 S into the set of states to which society may
transition. In other words, y 2 FE (x) means that the society may transition from x to y in
environment E. We do not assume that y 2 FE (x) implies x 2 FE (y), so certain transitions
may be irreversible. We impose:
Assumption 5 (Feasible Transitions) For each environment E 2 E, FE satises:
1. For any x 2 S, x 2 FE (x);
2. For any states x; y; z 2 S such that x < y < z or x > y > z: If z 2 FE (x), then y 2 FE (x)
and z 2 FE (y).
The key requirement, encapsulated in the second part, is that if a transition between two
states is feasible, then any transitions (in the same direction) between intermediate states are
also feasible. Special cases of this assumption include: (a) any transition is possible: FE (x) = S
for any x and E; (b) one-step transitions: y 2 FE (x) if and only if jx  yj  1; (c) one directional
transitions: y 2 FE (x) if and only if x  y.11
Finally, we assume that the discount factor,  2 [0; 1), is the same for all players and across
all environments. To recap, the full description of each environment E 2 E is given by a tuple
N;S; ; fuE;i (s)gs2Si2N ; fWE;sgs2S ; fFE (s)gs2S

.
11 In an earlier version, we also allowed for costs of transitions between states, which we now omit to simplify
the exposition.
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Each period t starts with environment Et 1 2 E and with state st 1 inherited from the
previous period; Nature determines Et with probability distribution  (Et 1; Et), and then the
players decide on the transition to any feasible st as we describe next. We take E0 2 E and
s0 2 S as given. At the end of period t, each player receives the stage payo¤
vti = uEt;i (st) . (1)
Denoting the expectation at time t by Et, the expected discounted payo¤ of player i by the
end of period t can be written as
V ti = Et
X1
k=0
kuEt+k;i (st+k) .
The timing of events within each period is:
1. The environment Et 1 and state st 1 are inherited from period t  1.
2. There is a change in environment from Et 1 to Et 2 E with probability  (Et 1; Et).
3. Society (collectively) decides on state st, subject to st 2 FE (st 1).
4. Each player gets stage payo¤ given by (1).
We omit the exact sequence of moves determining transitions across states (in step 3) as
this is not required for the Markov Voting Equilibrium (MVE) concept. The exact game form
is introduced when we study the noncooperative foundations of MVE.12
MVE will be characterized by a collection of transition mappings  = fE : S ! SgE2E .
We let kE be the k
th iteration of E (with 
0
E (s) = s). With , we can associate continuation
payo¤s V E;i (s) for player i in state s and environment E, which are recursively given by
V E;i (s) = uE;i (s) + 
X
E02E

 
E;E0

V E0;i (E0 (s)) . (2)
As 0   < 1, the values V E;i (s) are uniquely dened by (2).
Denition 3 (Markov Voting Equilibrium, MVE) A collection of transition mappings
 = fE : S ! SgE2E is a Markov Voting Equilibrium if the following three properties hold:
1. (feasibility) for any environment E 2 E and for any state x 2 S, E (x) 2 FE (x);
12 In what follows, we use MVE both for the singular (Markov Voting Equilibrium) and plural (Markov Voting
Equilibria).
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2. (core) for any environment E 2 E and for any states x; y 2 S such that y 2 FE (x),n
i 2 N : V E;i (y) > V E;i (E (x))
o
=2WE;x; (3)
3. (status quo persistence) for any environment E 2 E and for any state x 2 S,n
i 2 N : V E;i (E (x))  V E;i (x)
o
2WE;x.
Property 1 requires that MVE involves only feasible transitions (in the current environment).
Property 2 is satised if no (feasible) alternative y 6=  (x) is supported by a winning coalition in
x over E (x) prescribed by the transition mapping E . This is analogous to a coreproperty:
no alternative should be preferred to the proposed transition by some su¢ ciently powerful
coalition of players; otherwise, the proposed transition would be blocked. Of course, in this
comparison, players should focus on continuation utilities, which is what (3) imposes. Property
3 requires that it takes a winning coalition to move from any state to some alternative  i.e.,
to move away from the status quo. This requirement singles out the status quo if there is no
alternative strictly preferred by some winning coalition.
In addition, we say E is monotone if for all x; y 2 S such that x  y, we have E(x)  E(y)
( is monotone if each of the Es is monotone). For now, we focus on monotone MVE, i.e.,
MVE with monotone transition mappings for each E 2 E . In many cases this is without loss of
generality, and Theorem 9 states mild su¢ cient conditions for when all MVE are (generically)
monotone. We also refer to any state x such that E(x) = x as a steady state or stable in E.
In what follows, with some abuse of notation, we will often suppress the reference to the
environment and use, e.g., ui (s) instead of uE;i (s) or  instead of E , when this causes no
confusion.
3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the structure of MVE. We rst prove existence of monotone MVE in a
stationary (deterministic) environment. We then extend these results to situations in which there
are stochastic shocks and nonstationary elements. After establishing the relationship between
MVE and Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of a dynamic game representing the framework of
Section 2, we present a number of comparative static results for our general model.
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3.1 Nonstochastic environment
We rst study the case without any stochastic shocks, or equivalently the case of only one
environment (jEj = 1) and thus suppress the subscript E.
For any mapping  : S ! S, the continuation utility of player i after a transition to s has
taken place is given by
V i (s) = ui (s) +
X1
k=1
kui

k (s)

. (4)
We start our analysis with several lemmas which will form the basis of our main results. The
next one emphasizes the role that the notion of quasi-median voters (QMV) plays in our theory.
Lemma 1 Suppose that vector fwi (s)g satises increasing di¤erences for S0  S. Take x; y 2
S0, s 2 S and i 2 N and let
P = fi 2 N : wi (y) > wi (x)g .
Then P 2Ws if and only if Ms  P . A similar statement is true for relations , <, .
Lemma 1 is a consequence of the following reasoning: From increasing di¤erences in payo¤s,
if wi (y) > wi (x) for members of Ws, then this holds for all i  maxMs if y < x and for all
i  minMs if y > x. In either case, this establishes the ifpart of the lemma. The only if
part also follows from increasing di¤erences: wi (y) > wi (x) must hold for a connected coalition,
and therefore it holds for all members of Ms (from Denition 2).
For each s 2 S, let us introduce the binary relation >s on the set of n-dimensional vectors
to designate that there exists a winning coalition in s strictly preferring one payo¤ vector to
another. Formally:
w1 >s w
2 , i 2 N : w1i > w2i 	 2Ws.
The relation s is dened similarly. Lemma 1 now implies that if a vector fwi (x)g satises
increasing di¤erences, then for any s 2 S, the relations >s and s are transitive on fw (x)gx2S .
Our next result is critical for the rest of our analysis, establishing that, under Assumption 2
and 5, when  is monotone, then continuation utilities
n
V i (s)
os2S
i2N
satisfy increasing di¤erences.
Lemma 2 For a mapping  : S ! S, the vector
n
V i (s)
os2S
i2N
, given by (4), satises increasing
di¤erences if
1.  is monotone; or
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2. for all x 2 S, j (x)  xj  1.
This result is at the root of the central role of QMVs in our model. As is well known,
median voter type results do not generally apply with multidimensional policy choices. Since
our players are e¤ectively voting over innite dimensional choices (a sequence of policies), a
natural conjecture would have been that such results would not apply in our setting either.
The reason they do has a similar intuition to why voting sequentially over two dimensions of
policy, over each of which preferences satisfy single crossing (increasing di¤erences) or single
peakedness, does lead to the median voter type outcomes. By backward induction, the second
vote has a well-dened median voter, and then given this choice, the median voter over the rst
one can be determined. Loosely speaking, our recursive formulation of todays value enables
us to apply this reasoning between the vote today and the vote tomorrow, and the fact that
continuation utilities satisfy increasing di¤erences is the critical step in this argument.
For mapping  to constitute a MVE, it must satisfy the three properties of Denition 3. Of
these, the coreproperty is the most substantive one. The next lemma simplies the analysis
considerably by proving that if for a monotone mapping  the core property is violated (i.e., there
is a deviation that makes all members of some winning coalition in the current state better o¤),
then one can nd a monotone deviation i.e., a valid deviation such that the resulting mapping
after the deviation is also monotone. We call this result the Monotone Deviation Principle with
analogy to the One-Stage Deviation Principle in extensive form games, which also simplies the
set of deviations one has to consider (because if some deviation makes a player better o¤, then
there is a one-stage deviation which also does so).
Lemma 3 (Monotone Deviation Principle) Suppose that  : S ! S is feasible (part 1 of
Denition 3) and monotone but the core property is violated in the sense that for some x; y 2 S
(such that y 2 F (x)),
V  (y) >x V
 ( (x)) . (5)
Then there exist x; y 2 S such that y 2 F (x), (5) still holds, and the mapping 0 : S ! S given
by
0 (s) =

 (s) if s 6= x
y if s = x
(6)
is monotone.
With the help of the Monotone Deviation Principle, we can prove the following result, which
will be used to establish the existence of MVE.
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Lemma 4 (No Double Deviation) Let a 2 [1;m  1], and let 1 : [1; a] ! [1; a] and 2 :
[a+ 1;m]! [a+ 1;m] be two monotone mappings which are MVE on their respective domains.
Let  : S ! S be dened by
 (s) =

1 (s) if s  a
2 (s) if s > a
(7)
Then exactly one of the following is true:
1.  is a MVE on S;
2. there is z 2 [a+ 1;  (a+ 1)] such that z 2 F (a) and V  (z) >a V  ( (a));
3. there is z 2 [ (a) ; a] such that z 2 F (a+ 1) and V  (z) >a+1 V  ( (a+ 1)).
Intuitively, this lemma states that if we split the set of states into two subsets, [1; a] and
[a+ 1;m], and nd (by induction) the MVE on these respective domains, then the combined
mapping may fail to be an MVE only if either a winning coalition in a prefers to move to some
(feasible) state in [a+ 1;m], or a winning coalition in a + 1 prefers to move to some state in
[1; a]. But crucially, these two possibilities are mutually exclusive  a result which we use to
prove our next theorem, establishing the existence of MVE.
Theorem 1 (Existence) There exists a monotone MVE. Moreover, if  is a monotone MVE,
then the equilibrium path s0; s1 =  (s1) ; s2 =  (s2) ; : : : is monotone, and there exists a limit
state s = s+1 = : : : = s1.
We now provide a brief sketch of the proof of this theorem which is by induction on the
number of states (here we assume for simplicity that all transitions are feasible). If m = 1, then
 : S ! S given by  (1) = 1 is an MVE for trivial reasons. For m > 1, we assume, to obtain
a contradiction, that there is no MVE. Take any of m   1 possible splits of S into nonempty
Ca = f1; : : : ; ag and Da = fa+ 1; : : : ;mg, where a 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g, and then take MVE a1 on
Ca and MVE a2 on Da (assume for simplicity that they are unique; the Appendix describes the
way we select a1 and 
a
2 in the general case). Lemma 4 implies that either there is a deviation
from a to [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] or a deviation from a + 1 to [
a
1 (a) ; a], but not both. Denote
g (a) = r (for right) in the former case, and g (a) = l in the latter. Then g is a well-dened
single-valued function. We then have the following possibilities.
If g (1) = r, we can extendthe MVE 12 onto the entire domain by assigning  (1) 2 [2;m]
appropriately; similarly, if g (m  1) = l, we can extend m 11 by choosing  (m) 2 [1;m  1]
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appropriately (the details are provided in the Appendix). It remains to consider the case where
g (1) = l and g (m  1) = r. Then there must exist a 2 f2; : : : ;m  1g such that g (a  1) = l
and g (a) = r. We take equilibria a 11 on [1; a  1] and a2 on [a+ 1;m], and consider  : S ! S
given by
 (s) =
8<:
a 11 (s) if s < a
b if s = a
a2 (s) if s > a
,
where b 2 a 11 (a  1) ; a  1 [ [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] is picked so that V i (b) is maximized for
some i 2 Ma (and b 2 F (a)). Suppose, without loss of generality, that b < a, then j[1;a] is a
MVE on [1; a]. By Lemma 3, to show that the core property is satised, it su¢ ces to check that
there is no deviation from a+ 1 to [b; a]; this follows from g (a) = r. The other two properties,
feasibility and persitence, hold by construction, and thus  is MVE. The Appendix lls in the
details of this argument.
We next study the uniqueness of monotone MVE. We rst introduce the following denitions.
Denition 4 (Single-Peaked Preferences) Individual preferences are single-peaked if for
every i 2 N there exists x 2 S such that whenever, for states y; z 2 S, z < y  x or z > y  x,
ui (z) < ui (y).
Denition 5 (One-Step Transitions) We say that only one-step transitions are possible if
for any x; y 2 S with jx  yj > 1, y =2 F (x).
The next examples shows that a monotone MVE is not always unique.
Example 2 (Example with two MVE) Suppose that there are three states A;B;C, and two
players 1 and 2. The decision-making rule is unanimity in all states. Payo¤s are given by
id A B C
1 20 5 10
2 10 5 20
Then, with  su¢ ciently close to 1 (e.g.,  = 0:9), there are two MVE. In one, 1 (A) = 2 (B) =
A and 1 (C) = C. In another, 2 (A) = A, 2 (B) = 2 (C) = C. This is possible because
preferences are not single-peaked, and there is more than one QMV in all states. Example 6
in the Appendix shows that making preferences single peaked is by itself insu¢ cient to restore
uniqueness.
The next theorem provides su¢ cient conditions for generic uniqueness of monotone MVE.
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Theorem 2 (Uniqueness) The monotone MVE is (generically) unique if
1. for every s 2 S, Ms is a singleton; and/or
2. only one-step transitions are possible and preferences are single-peaked.
Though somewhat restrictive, several interesting applied problems satisfy one or the other
parts of the conditions of this theorem. In addition, Theorem 9 below shows that under essen-
tially the same assumptions any MVE is monotone.
3.2 Stochastic environments
We now extend our analysis to the case in which there are stochastic shocks, which will also
enable us to deal with nonstationaryin the economic environment, for example, because the
distribution of political power or economic preferences will change in a specic direction in the
future. By Assumption 1, environments are ordered as E1; E2; : : : ; Eh so that  (Ex; Ey) = 0
if x > y. This means that when (and if) we reach environment Eh, there will be no further
shocks, and the analysis from Section 3.1 is applicable from then on. In particular, we get the
same conditions for existence and uniqueness of MVE. We can now use backward induction from
environment Eh to characterize equilibrium transition mappings in lower-indexed environments,
essentially using Lemma 2, which established that when  is monotone, continuation utilities
satisfy increasing di¤erences.
Here we outline this backward induction argument. Take an MVE Eh in environment
Eh (its existence is guaranteed by Theorem 1). Suppose that we have characterized an
MVE fEgE2fEk;:::;Ehg for some k = 1; : : : ; h   1; let us construct Ek which would make
fEgE2fEk;:::;Ehg an MVE in fEk; : : : ; Ehg. Continuation utilities in environment Ek are:
V Ek;i (s) = uEk;i (s) + 
X
E02fEk;:::;Ehg

 
Ek; E
0V E0;i (E0 (s))
= uEk;i (s) + 
X
E02fEk+1;:::Ehg

 
Ek; E
0V E0;i (E0 (s)) (8)
+  (Ek; Ek)V

Ek;i
 
Ek (s)

.
By induction, we know E0 and V

E0 (E0 (s)) for E
0 2 fEk+1; : : : ; Ehg. We next show that there
exists Ek that is an MVE given continuation values
n
V Ek;i (s)
o
s2S
from (8). Denote
~uEk;i (s) = uEk;i (s) + 
X
E02fEk+1;:::;Ehg

 
Ek; E
0V E0;j (E0 (s)) ,
~ =  (Ek; Ek)
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Then rearranging equation (8):
V Ek;i (s) = ~uEk;i (s) +
~V Ek;i
 
Ek (s)

.
Since f~uEk;i (s)gs2Si2N satisfy increasing di¤erences, we can simply apply Theorem 1 to the modied
environment E =

N;S; ~; f~uEk;i (s)gs2Si2N ; fWEk;sgs2S ; fFEk (s)gs2S

to characterize Ek . Then
by denition of MVE, since fEgE2fEk;:::;Ehg was an MVE, we have that fEgE2fEk;:::Ehg is an
MVE in fEk; : : : ; Ehg, proving the desired result. Proceeding inductively we characterize an
entire MVE  = fEgE2fE1;:::Ehg. This argument establishes:
Theorem 3 (Existence) There exists an MVE  = fEgE2E . Furthermore, there exists a
limit state s = s+1 = : : : = s1 (with probability 1) but this limit state depends on the timing
and realization of stochastic shocks and the path to a limit state need not be monotone.
Establishing the uniqueness of MVE is more challenging because single peakedness is not
necessarily inherited by continuation utilities (this is shown, for instance, by Example 7 in the
Appendix). Nevertheless, the following theorem provides straightforward su¢ cient conditions
for uniqueness.
Theorem 4 (Uniqueness) The monotone MVE is (generically) unique if at least one of the
following conditions holds:
1. for every environment E 2 E and any state s 2 S, ME;s is a singleton;
2. in each environment, only one-step transitions are possible; each players preferences are
single-peaked; and, moreover, for each state s there is a player i such that i 2ME;s for all
E 2 E and the peaks (for all E 2 E) of is preferences do not lie on di¤erent sides of s.
The rst su¢ cient condition is the same as in Theorem 2, while the second strengthens its
equivalent: it would be satised, for example, if players bliss points and the distribution of
political power do not change muchas a result of shocks.
3.3 Noncooperative game
We have so far presented the concept of MVE without introducing an explicit noncooperative
game. This is partly motivated by the fact that several plausible noncooperative games would
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underpin the notional MVE. In this section, we provide one plausible and transparent nonco-
operative game and formally establish the relationship between the Markov Perfect Equilibria
(MPE) of this game and the set of MVE.
For each environment E 2 E and state s 2 S, let us introduce a protocol E;s, which is a
nite sequence of all states in Fs n fsg capturing the order in which di¤erent transitions are
considered within the period. Then the exact sequence of events in this noncooperative game is
given as follows:
1. The environment Et 1 and state st 1 are inherited from period t  1.
2. Environment transitions are realized: Et = E 2 E with probability  (Et 1; E).
3. The rst alternative, Et;st 1 (j) for j = 1, is voted against the status quo s. That is,
all players are ordered in a sequence and must support either the current proposal
Et;st 1 (j) or the status quo s.
13 If the set of those who supported Et;st 1 (j) is a winning
coalition  i.e., it is in WEt;st 1 then st = Et;st 1 (j); otherwise, this step repeats for
the next j. If all alternatives have been voted and rejected for j = 1; : : : ; jFsj  1, then the
new state is st = st 1.
4. Each player gets stage payo¤ given by (1).
We study (pure-strategy) MPE of this game. Naturally, each MPE induces an equilibrium
behavior which can be represented by a set of transition mappings  = fEgE2E . In particu-
lar, here E (s) is the state to which the equilibrium play transitions starting with state s in
environment E. Then we have:
Theorem 5 (MVE vs. MPE)
1. For any MVE , there exists a set of protocols fE;sgs2SE2E such that there exists a MPE
which induces .
2. Conversely, if for some set of protocols fE;sgs2SE2E and some MPE , the corresponding
transition mapping  = fEgE2E is monotone, then it is an MVE.
13To avoid the usual problems with equilibria in voting games, we assume sequential voting for some xed
sequence of players. See Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2009) for a solution concept which would rene out
unnatural equilibria in voting games with simultaneous voting.
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This theorem thus establishes the close connection between MVE and MPE. Essentially, any
MVE corresponds to an MPE (for some protocol) and, conversely, any MPE corresponds to an
MVE, provided that this MPE induces monotone transitions.
3.4 Comparative statics
In this section, we present general comparative static results. We assume that parameter values
are generic. We say that environments E1 and E2, dened for the same set of players and set
of states, coincide on S0  S, if for each i 2 N and for any state x 2 S0, uE1;i (x) = uE2;i (x),
WE1;x = WE2;x, and also FE1 jS0 = FE2 jS0 (in the sense that for x; y 2 S0, y 2 FE1 (x) , y 2
FE2 (x)).
Our next result shows that in two environments E1 and E2 that coincide on a subset of states
(and di¤er arbitrarily on other states), there is a simple way of characterizing the transition
mapping of one environment at the steady state of the other. We also say that the MVE is
unique on S0  S if there exists a unique equilibrium when (transitions are) restricted to the
set of states S0. For the results in this section, we assume that there exists a unique MVE (e.g.,
either set of conditions of Theorem 4 hold).14
Theorem 6 (General Comparative Statics I) Suppose that environments E1 and E2 coin-
cide on S0 = [1; s]  S and that there is a unique MVE in both environments. For MVE 1 in
E1, suppose that 1 (x) = x for some x 2 S0. Then for MVE 2 in E2 we have 2 (x)  x.
The theorem says that if x is a steady state (limit state) in environment E1 and environments
E1 and E2 coincide on a subset of states [1; s] that includes x, then the MVE in E2 will either
stay at x or induce a transition to a greater state than x. Of course, the two environments can
be swapped: if y 2 S0 is such that 2 (y) = y, then 1 (y)  y. Moreover, since the ordering of
states can be reversed, a similar result applies when S0 = [s;m] rather than [1; s].
The intuition for Theorem 6 is instructive. The fact that 1 (x) = x implies that in environ-
ment E1, there is no winning coalition wishing to move from x to y < x. But when restricted to
S0, economic payo¤s and the distribution of political power are the same in environment E2 as in
E1, so in environment E2 there will also be no winning coalition supporting the move to y < x.
This implies 2 (x)  x. Note, however, that 2 (x) > x is possible even though 1 (x) = x, since
14A similar result can be established without uniqueness. For example, one can show that if for some x 2 S0,
for each MVE 1 in E
1, 1 (x)  x, with at least one MVE 1 such that 1 (x) = x, then all MVE 2 in E2
satisfy 2 (x)  x. Because both the statements of these results and the proofs are more involved, we focus here
on situations in which MVE are unique.
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the di¤erences in economic payo¤s or distribution of political power in states outside S0 may
make a move to higher states more attractive for some winning coalition in E2. Interestingly,
since how the two environments di¤er outside S0 is left totally unrestricted, this last possibility
can happen even if in environment E2 payo¤s outside S0 are lower for all players (this could be,
for example, because even though all playerspayo¤s decline outside S0, this change also removes
some slippery slopepreviously discouraging a winning coalition from moving to some state
z > x).
The idea of the proof of the theorem also follows from the intuition given in the previous
paragraph. To obtain the main idea, let us use the notation jS0 to represent the transition
function  restricted to the subset of states S0. Now if we had 2 (x) < x, then 1jS0 and 2jS0
would be two di¤erent mappings, both of which would be MVE on S0. But this would contradict
the uniqueness of MVE.
Theorem 6 compares MVE in two distinct environments. In this sense, we can think of it as
a comparative static with respect to an unanticipated shock (taking us from one environment to
the other). The next corollary states a similar result when there is a stochastic transition from
one environment to another.
Corollary 1 Suppose that E = fE1; E2g, E1 and E2 coincide on S0 = [1; s]  S, and the
MVE is unique in both environments. Suppose also that for MVE E1 in E1 and some x 2 S0,
E1 (x) = x, and this state x is reached before a switch from environment E1 to E2 occurs at
time t. Then the MVE E2 in environment E2 implies that s  x for all   t.
Put di¤erently, the corollary states that if steady state x is reached before a shock changes
the environment  in a way that only higher states are a¤ected as a result of this change in
environment  then the equilibrium after the change can only move society further towards
the direction where the shock happened or stay where it was; the equilibrium will never involve
moving back to a lower state than x. A straightforward implication is that the only way society
can stay in the set of states [1; x  1] is not to leave the set before the shock arrives.
An interesting application of this corollary can be derived when we consider x as a minimal
democratic state; states to the right of x as further developments of democracy or other rene-
ments; and environment E2 as representing some sort of threat to democracy. Then the corollary
implies that this threat to democracy may disrupt the emergence of this minimal democracy
if it arrives early. But if it arrives late, after this minimal democratic state  which thus can
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be considered as a democratic threshold has already been reached, it would not create a
reversal. Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, such a threat, if it arrives late, may act as an
impetus for additional transitions in a further democratic direction, even though it would have
prevented the emergence of this minimum democratic state had it arrived early.
Corollary 1 was formulated under the assumption that stable state x was reached before the
shock occurred. Our next result removes this constraint under the assumption that the discount
factor is low enough, i.e., that players are su¢ ciently myopic.
Theorem 7 (General Comparative Statics II) Suppose that E = fE1; E2g, 0 <
 (E1; E2) < 1,  (E2; E1) = 0, and E1 and E2 coincide on S0 = [1; s]  S. Then there ex-
ists 0 > 0 such that if  < 0, then in the unique MVE , if the initial state is s0 2 S0 such
that E1 (s0)  s0, then the entire path s0; s1; s2; : : : (induced both under environment E1 and
after the switch to E2) is monotone. Moreover, if the shock arrives at time t, then for all   t,
s  ~s , where ~s is the hypothetical path if the shock never arrives.
In a monotone MVE, equilibrium paths are monotone without shocks. But with shocks, this
is no longer true because the arrival of the shock can change the direction of the path. This
theorem shows that when the discount factor is su¢ ciently low and two environments coincide
on a subset of states, then the equilibrium path is monotone even with shocks, and equilibrium
paths with and without shocks can be ranked.
Under further assumptions on how the shock changes the distribution of political power, we
can also derive additional results on the dynamics of equilibrium paths. This is done in the next
theorem for the case in which shocks change the set of quasi-median voters  i.e., they change
the distribution of political power in a specic way.
Theorem 8 (General Comparative Statics III) Suppose that environments E1 and E2
have the same payo¤s, uE1;i (x) = uE2;i (x), that the same transitions are feasible (FE1 = FE2)
and that ME1;x = ME2;x for x 2 [1; s] and minME1;x = minME2;x for x 2 [s+ 1;m]. Suppose
also that the MVE 1 in E1 and MVE 2 in E2 are unique on any subset of [1; s]. Then
1 (x) = 2 (x) for any x 2 [1; s].
This result suggests that if the sets of winning coalition in some states to the right (x > s)
change such that the sets of quasi-median voters expand further towards the right (for example,
because some additional players on the right become additional veto players), then the transition
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mapping is una¤ected for states on the left that are not directly a¤ected by the change (i.e.,
x < s). For instance, applied to the dynamics of democratization, this theorem implies that an
absolute monarchs decision of whether to move to a constitutional monarchy is not a¤ected by
the power that the poor will be able to secure in this new regime provided that the monarch
himself still remains a veto player.
4 Application: Implications of Radical Politics
In this section, we apply our general framework to the study of radical politics, already briey
introduced in Example 1 in the Introduction. We rst describe the initial environment, E1.
There is a xed set of n players N = f l; : : : ; rg (so n = l + r + 1), which we interpret as
groups of individuals with the same preferences (e.g., ethnicities, economic interests or ideological
groupings) that have already solved the within-group collective action problem.
The weight of each group i 2 N is denoted by i and represents, for example, the number
of individuals within the group and thus its political power. Throughout this exercise, we
assume genericityof fig, in the sense that there are no two disjoint combinations of groups
with exactly the same weight (see Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2008, for a discussion of this
assumption). Group 0 is chosen such that it contains the median voter. Individuals in group i
have preferences (net of repression costs) given
wi (p) =   (p  bi)2 ,
where p is the policy choice of society and bi is the political bliss point of group i. We assume that
fbig is increasing in i, which ensures that preferences satisfy increasing di¤erences (Assumption
2). For example, those with high index can be interpreted as the richor right-winggroups
that prefer higher levels of the (pro-rich or right-wing) policy.
The set of states is S = f l   r; : : : ; l + rg, and so the total number of states is m =
2l+2r+1 = 2n 1. States correspond to di¤erent combinations of political rights. Political rights
of certain groups can be reduced by repression (which is potentially costly as described below).
The set of groups that are not repressed in state s is denoted by Hs, where Hs = f l; : : : ; r + sg
for s  0 and Hs = f l + s; : : : ; rg for s > 0.15 Only the groups that are not repressed
participate in politics. This implies that in state 0, which corresponds to democracywith no
15We could allow for the repression of any combination of groups, thus having to consider 2n   1 rather than
2n 1 states, but choose not to do so to save on notation. Partial repression of some groups could also be allowed,
with similar results.
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repression, group 0 contains the median voter. In states below 0, some groups with right-wing
preferences are repressed, and in the leftmost state s =  l   r, only the group  l participates
in decision-making (all other groups are repressed). Similarly, in states above 0 some of the
left-wing groups are repressed (in rightmost state s = l+ r only group r has power). We assume
that all transitions across states are feasible.
Policy p and transitions across states are decided by a simple majority of those with political
rights (groups that are not repressed). This implies that policy will always be chosen as the
political bliss point of the quasi-median voter (given political rights), bMs . Our assumptions
so far (in particular, the genericity of fig) ensure that Ms contains a single group. The cost
of repressing each individual in group j is denoted by Cj and is assumed to be incurred by all
players. So stage payo¤s are given as
ui (s) = wi (p) 
X
j =2Hs
jCj ;
=   (bMs   bi)2  
X
j =2Hs
jCj .
Finally, we also assume that the radical group l is smaller than the next group:  l <  l+1,
which implies that radicals can implement their preferred policy only by repressing all of the
groups in society.
We model power shifts by introducing h radicalenvironments R l r; : : : ; R l r+h 1, each
with probability j for j = 1; : : : ;m at each date starting from E1. Environment Rj is the same
as E1, except that in environment Rj , if the current state is one of  l   r; : : : ; j, the radical
group,  l, acquires the ability to force a transition to any other state (in the process incurring
the costs of repression). In particular, the radicals can choose to grab powerby repressing all
other groups and transitioning to state s =  l   r. In the context of the Bolshevik Revolution,
for example, this corresponds to assuming that in some possible environments (i.e., with some
probability), Bolsheviks are able to grab control with Kerensky in power but not necessarily
with some further right government. Therefore, in state s, the probability of the radicals having
an opportunity to grab power is s =
Ps
j= l r j , which is naturally (weakly) increasing in s.
We also assume that in each period in any of the environments Rj , there is a probability
 of returning to the initial environment, E1. This is equivalent to a transition to the nal
environment Ef identical to E1 in terms of payo¤s and winning coalitions (but there will be
no further possibility of radicals coming to power after that). Clearly,  = 0 corresponds to a
permanent shock, and as  increases, the expected length of the period during which radicals
24
can dictate transitions declines. Note, however, that if the rst time they get the opportunity,
radicals grab power permanently, imposing a transition to state s =  l   r (in which they are
the dictator), then they will remain in power even after there is a transition to environment Ef .
The next proposition characterizes MVE in an environment in which there is no possibility
of a radical takeover of power. This environment can be represented by Ef (since from Ef there
is no further transition and thus no possibility of a radical takeover of power), and we use this
convention to avoid introducing further notation.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria without radicals) Without the possibility of radicals grabbing
power (i.e., in environment Ef ), there exists a unique MVE represented by Ef : S ! S. In
this equilibrium:
1. Democracy is stable: Ef (0) = 0.
2. For any costs of repression fCjgj2N , there is never more repression than the initial state:
i.e., if s < 0 then Ef (s) 2 [ s; 0], and if s > 0, then Ef (s) 2 [0; s].
3. Consider repression costs parametrized by k: Cj = kCj , where
n
Cj
o
are positive con-
stants. There exists k > 0 such that: if k > k, then Ef (s) = 0 for all s, and if k < k
,
then Ef (s) 6= 0 for some s.
Without radicals, democracy is stable because the median voter knows that she can choose
policies in the future (and can do so without incurring any cost of repression). Nevertheless, other
states may also be stable. For instance, starting from a situation in which there is repression
of the left, the quasi-median voter in that state may not nd it benecial to reduce repression
because this will typically lead to further left policies (relative to the political bliss point of
the quasi-median voter). But this type of repression is also limited by the cost of repression
which all players, including the quasi-median voter in the initial state, incur. If these costs are
su¢ ciently high, then repression becomes unattractive starting from any state, and democracy
becomes the only stable state.
The next proposition shows how political dynamics change when there is a risk of a radical
takeover of power.
Proposition 2 (Radicals) There exists a unique MVE. Suppose that when the society is at
state s, there is a transition to environment Rz (where z  s) so that radicals can grab power.
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Then, when they have the opportunity, the radicals are more likely to move to state s =  l   r
(repressing all other groups) when: (a) they are more radical (meaning their ideal point b l is
lower, i.e., further from 0); (b) they are weaker (i.e., z is smaller) in the sense that there is
a smaller set of states in which they are able to control power.
This proposition is intuitive. When they have more radical preferences, radicals value the
prospect of imposing their political bliss point more and are willing to incur the costs of repression
to do so. They are also more likely to do so when they are weakerbecause when z is lower,
there is a greater range of states in which they cannot control future transitions, encouraging
an immediate transition to s =  l   r.
To state our next proposition, we dene
Wi (s) = ui (s) + 
 l r+h 1X
z= l r
zVRz ;i (s) ,
which intuitively corresponds to the (counterfactual) expected continuation value of group i
when it permanently stays in state s 2 S until a shock changes the environment, and from then
on follows the MVE play:
Proposition 3 (Repression by moderates anticipating radicals) The transition mapping
before radicals come to power, E1, satises the following properties.
1. If s  0, then E1 (s)  s.
2. If W0 (0) < W0 (s) for some s > 0, then there is a state x  0 such that E1 (s) > s. In
other words, there exists some state in which there is an increase in the repression of the
left in order to decrease the probability of a radical takeover of power.
3. If for all states y > x  0, WMx (y) < WMx (x), then for all s  0, E1 (s)  s. In other
words, repression of the left never increases when the cost of repression increase (e.g.,
letting Cj = kCj , it declines when k increases).
The rst part of the proposition indicates that there is no reason for repression of the right
to increase starting from states below s = 0; rather, in these states the tendency is to reduce
repression. However, the second part shows that if the median voter (in democracy) prefers a
more repressive state when she could counterfactually ensure no further repression unless radicals
come to power (which she cannot do because she is not in control in that state), then there is
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at least one state from which there will be an increase of repression against the left (which does
not necessarily have to be s = 0). An important implication of this result is that even if there
are slippery slopeconsiderations, these are not su¢ cient to prevent all repression. The third
part of the proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for the opposite result.
The rst part implies that anticipation of a radical takeover of power leads to (weakly) greater
repression, at least starting from a su¢ ciently democraticstate. In particular, in some states
s > 0, there will necessarily be lower repression after the threat of radicals disappears.
Proposition 4 (Stability of democracy without a threat of radical) Suppose that full
democracy s = 0 does not allow for radicals coming to power (i.e., s = 0). Then s = 0 is stable
in all environments, and any state s > 0 will lead to (weakly) less repression, in the sense that
E1 (s) 2 [0; s] for s > 0.
Proposition 4 shows that if democracy is resilient against radicalspower grabs, then it is
stable regardless of the possibility of radicals taking over power in other, less democratic states.
The next proposition is an application of our general comparative static results given in
Theorem 6.
Proposition 5 (Comparative statics of repression) Suppose that there is a state s 
0 (i.e., democracy or some state favoring the right), which is stable in E1 for some set of
probabilities

j
	
. Consider a change from

j
	
to
n
0j
o
such that 0j = j for j  s. Then
there will be (weakly) less repression of the left after the change, i.e., 0E1 (s)  E1 (s) = s.
The intuition is the same as Theorem 6: if the probabilities of a radical takeover of power
change, but only in states that already had repression against the left, and we are in a stable state
without repression against the right, then this can only reduce repression. If there is now a lower
likelihood of a radical grab of power, then this favors less repression. But, paradoxically, even if
there is a higher likelihood of such a grab, because of reduced slippery slopeconsiderations,
there may be less repression.
The next result compares the transition in anticipation of radicals (environment E1) and in
the case where radicals are gone  or, equivalently, if they are impossible (environment Ef ).
An implication of this result is a particular type of history dependence in steady-state regime.
Proposition 6 (Role of radicals in history)
27
1. If for s  0, E1 (s) = 0, then Ef (s) = 0.
2. Suppose the society was in a stable state x  0 (in environment E1) before the radical
came to power. Then the limit state (as t ! 1), after the radicals come and possibly go
(n environment Ef ), will be some y  x.
The rst part of this proposition shows that the society is at least as likely to cease and any
repression and fully democratize once radicals are gone as it is when the arrival of radicals is
possible (conversely, if Ef (s) > 0, then necessarily E1 (s) > 0).
16 Intuitively, initially democ-
ratization increases the chance of a radical grab of power, and hence radicals democratization
is (weakly) more likely after the radicals are gone. The second part has a related logic and es-
tablishes a type of history dependence: the arrival and possible departure of radicals will never
lead to more repression of the left than the initial situation and may lead to less repression. This
may happen in two ways. First, and less interestingly, the radicals may lock in power forever.
Second, when they do not or cannot do that, because the threat of radicals has disappeared,
there will be less repression in the stable state.
In the next result, we apply Theorem 8 to show that all the results come from radicals
grabbing power rather than just becoming inuential enough to become veto players. For this
proposition, let us expand our environment to allow for veto players (instead of all decisions
being made by majoritarian voting among groups with political rights).
Proposition 7 (Radicals as veto players) If shocks make radicals veto players while pre-
serving democratic decision-making, then mapping  (s) js0 is the same as in the benchmark
case where the initial environment is stable.
The intuitionis simple: the current quasi-median voter fears a radical power grab and sub-
sequent dictatorship. If the risk is that the radicals will just become veto players, this is not
su¢ cient to induce repression against the left.
Our last result deals with strategic complementarity in repressions. To state this result,
consider a change in the costs of repression so that it becomes cheaper for radicals to repress
right-wing groups. In particular, the state payo¤ function of radicals changes to
u l (s) =   (bMs   b l)2   
X
j =2Hs
jCj
16 It is also straightforward to construct an example where Ef (s) = 0 but E1 (s) > 0 (and even E1 (s) > s).
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for s < 0 and  2 [0; 1]. Clearly,  = 1 corresponds to our baseline environment, and a decrease
in  implies that radicals can repress right-wing groups with less cost to themselves. Then:
Proposition 8 (Strategic Complementarity) Suppose that z = 0 for all z > 0 (meaning
that radicals can only seize power if they are not currently repressed). Consider a change in the
radicalsrepression costs to 0 <  and denote the MVE before and after the change by  and 0
respectively. Then if E1 (s) > s for some s  0, 0E1 (s) > s.
Put di¤erently, the proposition implies that if E1 (0) > 0, then 
0
E1 (0) > 0, so that re-
pression of the radicals is more likely when they themselves have lower costs of repressing other
groups. At the root of this result is a strategic complementarity in repression: anticipating
greater repression by radicals in future radical environments, the current political system now
becomes more willing to repress the radicals. One interesting implication of this result is that
di¤erences in repression of di¤erent ends of the political spectrum across societies may result
from small di¤erences in (institutional or social) costs of repression rather than a culture of re-
pressionin some countries. Thus, the brutal repression of rst left- and then right-wing groups
in early 20th-century Russia, contrasted with a lack of such systematic repression in Britain may
not just be a reection of a Russian culture of repression, but a game-theoretic consequence of
the anticipation of di¤erent patterns of repression in di¤erent political states in Russia.
5 Extensions
In this section, we rst provide (simple and relatively mild) conditions under which all MVE
are monotone. This justies our focus on monotone MVE throughout the rest of the paper. We
then relate our paper in more detail to Roberts (1999) discussed already in the Introduction.
We also discuss how our results will be di¤erent with innitely many shocks. Finally, we show
how our framework can be extended to economies with a continuum of states and/or players.
5.1 Monotone vs nonmonotone MVE
So far, we focused on monotone MVE. In many interesting cases this is without loss of generatlity,
as the following theorem establishes.
Theorem 9 (Monotonicity of MVE) Under either of the following conditions, all MVE are
generically monotone:
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1. In all environments, the sets of quasi-median voters in two di¤erent states have either zero
or exactly one player in common: for all E 2 E ; x; y 2 S : x 6= y ) jME;x \ME;yj  1.
2. In all environments, only one-step transitions are possible.
The rst part of the theorem covers, among others, situations where the sets of quasi-median
voters are singletons in all states. This implies that whenever there is a dictator in each state
(which may be the same for several states), or there is majority voting among sets of odd
numbers of players, any MVE is monotone, and thus all results in the paper are applicable to all
MVE  rather than the monotone subset of MVE. The second part shows that if only one-step
transitions, i.e., transitions to adjacent states, are possible, then again any MVE is monotone.
This means that our focus on monotone MVE is with little loss of generality for many interesting
and relevant cases.
Note also that the conditions in Theorem 9 are weaker than those in Theorem 2 and 4.
Consequently, when these latter theorems ensure the uniqueness of a monotone MVE, they also
imply that the MVE is in fact unique.
The next example shows that both conditions in Theorem 9 cannot be simultaneously dis-
pensed with.
Example 3 There are three states A;B;C, and two players 1 and 2. The decision-making rule
is unanimity in all states, and all transitions are possible. Payo¤s are given by
id A B C
1 30 50 40
2 10 40 50
Suppose  is relatively close to 1, e.g.,  = 0:9. This situation does not satisfy either set of
conditions of Theorem 9. It is straightforward to verify that there is a nonmonotone MVE
 (A) =  (C) = C,  (B) = B. (There is also a monotone equilibrium with  (A) =  (B) = B,
 (C) = C.)
The next example shows that monotonicity may fail non-generically even when the conditions
of Theorem 9 are satised.
Example 4 There are two states A and B and two players 1 and 2. Player 1 is the dictator
in both stattes. Payo¤s are given by
id A B
1 20 20
2 15 25
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Take any discount factor , e.g.,  = 0:5, and any protocol. Then there exists a nonmonotone
(in fact, cyclic) MVE  given by  (A) = B and  (B) = A. However, any perturbation of the
payo¤s of player 1 removes this nonmonotonic equilibrium.
Our last result in this section shows that even if nonmonotone MVE exist, they will still
induce monotone paths. We say that mapping  = fEgE2E induces monotone paths if for
any E 2 E and x 2 S,  (x)  x implies 2E (x)  E (x).
In other words, all equilibrium paths that this mapping generates, as long as the environment
does not change, are weakly monotone. We have the following result:
Theorem 10 (Monotone Paths) Any MVE  (not necessarily monotone) generically induces
monotone paths.
5.2 Relationship to Robertss model
As discussed in the Introduction, our paper is most closely related to Roberts (1999). Our notion
of MVE extends that of Roberts, who also looks at a dynamic equilibrium in an environment
that satises single-crossing type restrictions. More specically, in Robertss model, the society
consists of n players, and there are n possible states sk = f1; : : : ; kg ; 1  k  n. Each state sk
describes the situation where players f1; : : : ; kg are members of the club, while others are not.
There is the following condition on payo¤s:
for all l > k and j > i, uj (sl)  uj (sk) > ui (sl)  ui (sk) ,
which is the same as the strict increasing di¤erences condition we imposed above (Denition 1).
Roberts (1999) focuses on deterministic environments with majoritarian voting among club
members. He then looks at a notion of Markov Voting Equilibrium (dened as an equilibrium
path where there is a transition to a new club whenever there is an absolute majority in favor
of it) and a median voter rule (dened as an equilibrium path where at each point the current
median voter chooses the transition for the next step). Roberts proves existence for mixed-
strategy equilibria for each of the voting rules; they dene the same set of clubs that are stable
under these rules.
Robertss notion of Markov Voting Equilibrium is also a special case of ours. When our
notion is specialized to majoritarian voting, the two di¤er only in their treatment of situations
with clubswith even numbers of members.
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Overall, our setup and results generalize, extend and strengthen Roberts in several dimen-
sions. First, Roberts focuses on the deterministic and stationary environment, whereas we allow
for nonstationary elements and rich stochastic shocks. Second, we allow for fairly general dis-
tributions of political power across states, which is crucial for our focus, while Roberts assumes
majority rule for every club. Third, we prove existence of pure strategy equilibria and provide
conditions for uniqueness (results that do not have equivalents in Roberts). Fourth, we provide
a general characterization of the structure of MVE, which in turn paves the way for our general
comparative static results (again results that have no equivalents and Roberts). Fifth, we show
the relationship between this equilibrium concept and MPE of a fully specied dynamic game.
Finally, we show how our framework can be applied to a political economy problem, providing
new and interesting insights in this instance.
5.3 Innitely many shocks
Suppose that there is a nite set of environments E , but we relax Assumption 1, so that there
can be an innite number of shocks . In this case, MVE (as dened in Denition 3) may fail to
exist. Example 8 in the Appendix illustrates this possibility.
The reason why MVE may fail to exist is as follows. Take some set of mappings  = fEg
and assume that they dene transitions from period T onwards (for some large T ). Using the
same technique as in Section 3.2, we can show existence of a mapping [T 1] =
n

[T 1]
E
o
which
would determine transitions in period T   1; then we can do the same for period T   2, etc.
The problem is that these mappings may be di¤erent for di¤erent periods, whereas the natural
Markovian property would be to impose that they should be the same. Therefore, with innitely
many shocks, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium without this latter Markovian requirement,
but if we would also like to insist on this Markovian requirement, one has to work with mixed
strategies.17
5.4 Continuous spaces
In this subsection, we show how our results can be extended to economies with a continuum of
states and/or a continuum of players.
Suppose that the set of states is S = [sl; sh], and the set of players is given by N = [il; ih].
(The construction and reasoning below are easily extendable to the case where the are a nite
17Details are available from the authors upon request.
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number of players but a continuum of states, or vice versa.) We assume that each player has a
utility function ui (s) : S ! R, which is continuous as a function of (i; s) 2 N  S and satises
strict increasing di¤erences: for all i > j, x > y,
ui (x)  ui (y) > uj (x)  uj (y) .
The mapping F , which describes feasible transitions, is assumed to be upper-hemicontinuous on
S and to satisfy Assumption 5. Finally, for each state s there is a set of winning coalitions Ws,
which are assumed to satisfy Assumption 3. As before, for each state s, we have a non-empty
set of quasi-median voters Ms (which may nevertheless be a singleton). We make the following
monotonicity of quasi-median voters assumption: functions inf Ms and supMs are continuous
and increasing functions of s.
For simplicity, let us focus on the case without shocks and on monotone transition functions
 : S ! S (this function may be discontinuous). MVE is dened as in Denition 3. The
following result establishing the existence of MVE.
Theorem 11 (Existence in Continuous Spaces) With a continuum of states and/or play-
ers, there exists a MVE . Moreover, take any sequence of sets of states S1  S2     and
any sequence of players N1  N2     such that
S1
j=1 Sj is dense in S and
S1
j=1Nj is dense
in N . Consider any sequence of monotone functions

j : Sj ! Sj
	1
j=1
which are MVE (not
necessarily unique) in the environment
Ej =

N;S; ; fui (s)gs2Sji2Nj ; fWsgs2Sj ; fFj (s)gs2Sj

:
Existence of such MVE is guaranteed by Theorem 1, as all assumptions are satised. Then there
is a subsequence fjkg1k=1 such that

jk
	1
k=1
converges pointwise on
S1
j=1 Sj, to some MVE
 : S ! S.
This result therefore shows that an MVE exists and is extended environment and may be
characterized as a limit of equilibria for nite sets of states and players. The idea of the proof is
simple. Take an increasing sequence of sets of states , S1  S2     and an increasing sequence
of sets of players N1  N2     such that S1 =
S1
j=1 Sj is dense in S and N1 =
S1
j=1Nj is
dense in N . For each Sj , take MVE j . We know that i is a monotone function on Si. Let us
extend it to a monotone (not necessarily continuous) function on S which we denote by ~i for
each i. Since S1 and N1 are countable, there is a subsequence jk which converges to some
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 : S1 ! S1 pointwise. We then extend it to a function  : S ! S by demanding that  is
either left-continuous or right-continuous at any point (in the Appendix, we show that we can
do that so that the continuation values are either left-continuous or right-continuous as well).
Then this continuity of continuation values will ensure that  is an MVE.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a general framework for the analysis of dynamic political economy prob-
lems, including democratization, extension of political rights or repression of di¤erent groups.
The distinguishing feature of our approach is that it enables the analysis of non-stationary,
stochastic environments (e.g., allowing for anticipated and unanticipated shocks changing the
distribution of political power and economic payo¤s) under fairly rich heterogeneity and general
political or economic conict across groups.
We assume that the payo¤s are dened either directly on states or can be derived from
states, which represent economic and political institutions. For example, di¤erent distribution
of property rights or adoption of policies favoring one vs. another group correspond to di¤erent
states. Importantly, states also di¤er in their distribution of political power: as states change,
di¤erent groups become politically pivotal (and in equilibrium di¤erent coalitions may form).
Our notion of equilibrium is Markov Voting Equilibrium, which requires that economic and
political changes  transitions across states  should take place if there exists a subset of players
with the power to implement such changes and who will obtain higher expected discounted utility
by doing so.
We assume that both states and players are ordered: e.g., states go from more right-
wing to more left-wing (or less to more democratic) and players are ordered according to their
ideology or income level. Our most substantive assumptions are that, given these orders, stage
payo¤s satisfy a single crossing(increasing di¤erences) type assumption, and the distribution
of political power also shifts in the same direction of economic preferences (e.g., more right-
wing individuals gain relatively more from moving towards right-wing states than do left-wing
individuals, and their political power does not decrease if there is a transition towards such a
right-wing state).
Under these assumptions, we prove the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, provide
conditions for its uniqueness, and show that a limit state always exists (though it generally
depends on the order and exact timing of shocks). We also provide a number of comparative
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static results that apply at this level of generality. For example, if there is a change from one
environment to another (with di¤erent economic payo¤s and distribution of political power) but
the two environments coincide up to a certain state s0 and before the change the steady state of
equilibrium was at some state x  s0, then the new steady state after the change in environment
can be no smaller than x.
We then use this framework to study the dynamics of repression in the presence of radical
groups that can stochastically grab power depending on the distribution of political rights in
society. We characterize the conditions under which the presence of radicals leads to greater
repression (of less radical groups), show a type of path dependence in politics resulting from
radicals coming to power, and identify a novel strategic complementarity in repression.
There are several extensions of this framework that would be useful. These include: a gener-
alization of the results to an innite number of shocks (our analysis was simplied by assuming
that there are at most a nite number of transitions); greater individual-level heterogeneity,
which can change over time (e.g., a type of social mobility); and most importantly extensions
of the results to environments in which heterogeneity cannot be captured by a single dimensional
order. There are also several additional applications of our framework to problems in political
economy, organizational economics and public economics, which can be investigated in future
work.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. If: Suppose Ms  P , so for each i 2 Ms, wi (y) > wi (x). Consider
two cases. If y > x, then increasing di¤erences implies that wj (y) > wj (x) for all j  minMs.
On the other hand, [minMs; n] is a winning coalition (if not, i = Ms   1 would be a QMV by
denition, but such i =2Ms). If y < x, then, similarly, wj (y) > wj (x) for all j  maxMs, which
is a winning coalition for similar reasons. In either case, P contains a subset (either [minMs; n]
or [1;maxMs]) which is a winning coalition, and thus P 2Ws.
Only if: Suppose P 2 Ws. Consider the case y > x. Let i = minP ; then increasing
di¤erences implies that for all j  i, wj (y) > wj (x). This means that P = [i; n], and is thus a
connected coalition. Since P is winning, we must have i  j  n for any j 2 Ms by denition
of Ms, and therefore Ms  P . The case where y < x is similar, so Ms  P .
The proofs for relations , <,  are similar and are omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Part 1. Take y > x and any i 2 N . We have:
V i (y)  V i (x) = ui (y) +
X1
k=1
kui

k (y)

  ui (x) 
X1
k=1
kui

k (x)

= (ui (y)  ui (x)) +
X1
k=1
k

ui

k (y)

  ui

k (x)

.
The rst term is (weakly) increasing in i if fui (s)gs2Si2N satises increasing di¤erences, and the
second is (weakly) increasing in i as k (y)  k (x) for k  1 due to monotonicity of .
Consequently, (4) is (weakly) increasing in i.
Part 2. If  is monotone, then Part 1 applies. Otherwise, for some x < y we have  (x) >
 (y), and this means that y = x+ 1; there may be one or more such pairs. Notice that for such
x and y, we have  (x) = y and  (y) = x. Consider
V i (y)  V i (x) =

ui (y) +
X1
k=1
2k 1ui (x) +
X1
k=1
2kui (y)

 

ui (x) +
X1
k=1
2k 1ui (y) +
X1
k=1
2kui (x)

=
1
1 + 
(ui (y)  ui (x)) ;
this is (weakly) increasing in i.
Let us now modify stage payo¤s and dene
~ui (x) =

ui (x) if  (x) = x or 2 (x) 6= x;
(1  )Vi (x) if  (x) 6= x = 2 (x) .
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Consider mapping ~ given by
~ (s) =

 (x) if  (x) = x or 2 (x) 6= x;
x if  (x) 6= x = 2 (x) .
This ~ is monotone and f~ui (x)gx2Si2N satises increasing di¤erences. By Part 1, the continuation
values
n
~V
~
i (x)
ox2S
i2N
computed for ~ and f~ui (x)gx2Si2N using (4) satisfy increasing di¤erences as
well. But by construction, ~V
~
i (x) = V

i (x) for each i and s, and thus
n
V i (x)
ox2S
i2N
satises
increasing di¤erences. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for each x; y 2 S such that
y 2 F (x) and (5) holds, 0 given by (6) is not monotone.
Take x; y 2 S such that jy    (x)j is minimal among all such pairs x; y 2 S (informally, we
consider the shortest deviation). By our assertion, 0 is not monotone. Since  is monotone
and  and 0 di¤er by the value at x only, there are two possibilities: either for some z < x,
y = 0 (x) <  (z)   (x) or for some z > x,  (x)   (z) < 0 (x) = y. Assume the former (the
latter case may be considered similarly). Let s be dened by
s = min (z 2 S :  (z) > y) ;
in the case under consideration, the set of such z is nonempty (e.g., x is its member, and z found
earlier is one as well), and hence state s is well-dened. We have s < x; since  is monotone,
 (s)   (x).
Notice that a deviation in state s from  (s) to y is monotone: indeed, there is no state ~z
such that ~z < s and y <  (~z)   (s) by construction of s, and there is no state ~z > s such
that  (s)   (~z) < y as this would contradict  (s) > y. Moreover, it is feasible, so y 2 F (s):
this is automatically true if y = s; if y > s, this follows from s < y <  (s); and if y < s, this
follows from y = 0 (x) and y < s  x. By assertion, this deviation cannot be protable, i.e.,
V  (y) s V  ( (s)). By Lemma 2, since y <  (s), V maxMs (y)  V

maxMs
( (s)). Since s < x,
Assumption 4 implies (for i = maxMx) V

i (y)  V i ( (s)).
On the other hand, (5) implies V i (y) > V

i ( (x)). We therefore have
V i ( (s))  V i (y) > V i ( (x)) (A1)
and thus, by Lemma 2, since  (s) <  (x) (we know  (s)   (x), but  (s) =  (x) would
contradict (A1)),
V  ( (s)) >x V
 ( (x)) .
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Notice, however, that y <  (s) <  (x) implies that j (s)   (x)j < jy    (x)j. This
contradicts the choice of y such that jy    (x)j is minimal among pairs x; y 2 S such that
y 2 F (x) and (5) is satised. This contradiction proves that our initial assertion was wrong,
and this proves the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We show rst that if [1] is the case, then [2] and [3] are not satised.
We then show that if [1] does not hold, then either [2] or [3] are satised, and nish the proof
by showing that [2] and [3] are mutually exclusive.
First, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that both [1] and [2] hold. Then [2] implies that for
some z 2 [a+ 1;  (a+ 1)] such that z 2 F (a), V  (z) >a V  ( (a)), but this contradicts that 
is MVE, so [1] cannot hold. We can similarly prove that if [1] holds, then [3] is not satised.
Second, suppose that [1] does not hold. Notice that for any x 2 S,  (x) 2 F (x) and
V  ( (x)) x V  (x), because these properties hold for 1 if x 2 [1; a] and for 2 if x 2 [a+ 1;m].
Consequently, if  is not MVE, then it is because the (core) condition in Denition 3 is violated.
Lemma 3 then implies existence of a monotone deviation, i.e., x; y 2 S such that y 2 F (x) and
V  (y) >x V
 ( (x)). Since 1 and 2 are MVE on their respective domains, we must have that
either x 2 [1; a] and y 2 [a+ 1;m] or x 2 [a+ 1;m] and y 2 [1;m]. Assume the former; since
the deviation is monotone, we must have x = a and a + 1  y   (a+ 1). Hence, we have
V  (y) >a V
 ( (a)), and this shows that [2] holds. If we assumed the latter, we would similarly
get that [3] holds. Hence, if [1] does not hold, then either [2] or [3] does.
Third, suppose that both [2] and [3] hold. Let
x 2 arg max
z2[(a);(a+1)]\F (a)
V minMa (z) ,
y 2 arg max
z2[(a);(a+1)]\F (a+1)
V maxMa+1 (z) ;
then x  a + 1 > a  y. By construction, V minMa (x) > V

minMa
(y) and V maxMa+1 (y) >
V maxMa+1 (x) (the inequalities are strict because they are strict in [2] and [3]). But this vio-
lates the increasing di¤erences that
n
V i (s)
os2S
i2N
satises as  is monotone (indeed, minMa 
maxMa+1 by Assumption 4). This contradiction proves that [2] and [3] are mutually exclusive,
which completes the proof. 
For the proof of Theorem 1, the following auxiliary result (which is itself a corollary of
Lemma 4) is helpful.
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Lemma 5 (Extension of Equilibrium) Let S1 = [1;m  1] and S2 = fmg. Suppose that
 : S1 ! S1 is a monotone MVE, and that F (m) 6= fmg. Let
a = max

arg max
b2[(m 1);m 1]\F (m)
V maxMm (b)

. (A2)
If
V  (a) >m u (m) = (1  ) , (A3)
then mapping 0 : S ! S dened by
0 (s) =

 (s) if s < m
a if s = m
is MVE. A similar statement, mutatis mutandis, applies for S1 = f1g and S2 = [2;m].
Proof of Lemma 5. Mapping 0 satises property 1 of Denition 3 by construction. Let
us show that it satises property 2. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that this is not the case.
By Lemma 3, there are states x; y 2 S such that
V 
0
(y) >x V
0  0 (x) , (A4)
and this deviation is monotone. Suppose rst that x < m, then y   (m) = a  m   1.
For any z  m   1,  0k (z) = k (z) for all k  0, and thus V 0 (z) = V  (z); therefore,
V  (y) >x V
 ( (x)). However, this would contradict that  is a MVE on S1. Consequently,
x = m. If y < m, then (A4) implies, given a = 0 (m),
V  (y) >m V
 (a) . (A5)
Since the deviation is monotone, y 2 [ (m  1) ;m  1], but then (A5) contradicts the choice of
a in (A2). This implies that x = y = m, so (A4) may be rewritten as
V 
0
(m) >m V
 (a) . (A6)
But since
V 
0
(m) = u (m) + V  (a) , (A7)
(A6) implies
u (m) >m (1  )V  (a) .
This, however, contradicts (A3), which proves that 0 satises property 2 of Denition 3.
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To prove that 0 is MVE, we need to establish that it satises property 3 of Denition 3, i.e.,
V 
0  
0 (x)
 x V 0 (x) (A8)
for each x 2 S0. If x 2 S (i.e., x < m), then  0k (x) = k (x) for any k  0, so (A8) is
equivalent to V  ( (x)) x V  (x), which is true for x < m, because  is MVE on S. It remains
to prove that (A8) is satised for x = m. In this case, (A8) may be rewritten as
V  (a) m V 0 (m) . (A9)
Taking (A7) into account, (A9) is equivalent to (1  )V  (a) m u (m),which is true, provided
that (A3) is satised. We have thus proved that 0 is MVE on S0, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove this result by induction by the number of states. For any
set X, let X be the set of monotone MVE, so we have to prove that X 6= ?.
Base: If m = 1, then  : S ! S given by  (1) = 1 is MVE for trivial reasons.
Induction Step: Suppose that if jSj < m, then MVE exists. Let us prove this if jSj = m.
Consider the set A = [1;m  1], and for each a 2 A, consider two monotone MVE a1 : [1; a]!
[1; a] and a2 : [a+ 1;m]! [a+ 1;m]. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
a1 2 arg max
2[1;a];z2[(a);a]\F (a+1)
V maxMa+1 (z) ,
a2 2 arg max
2[a+1;m];z2[a+1;(a+1)]\F (a)
V minMa (z)
(whenever [ (a) ; a] \ F (a+ 1) = ? or [a+ 1;  (a+ 1)] \ F (a) are empty, we pick any a1 or
a2, respectively). For each a 2 A, dene a : S ! S by
a (s) =

a1 (s) if s  a
a2 (s) if s > a
.
Let us dene function f : A ! f1; 2; 3g as follows. By Lemma 4, for every split S =
[1; a] [ [a+ 1;m] given by a 2 A and for MVE a1 and a2, exactly one of three properties hold;
let f (a) be the number of the property. Then, clearly, if for some a 2 A, f (a) = 1, then a is a
monotone MVE by construction of function f .
Now let us consider the case where for every a 2 A, f (a) 2 f2; 3g. We have the following
possibilities.
First, suppose that f (1) = 2. This means that (since a1 (1) = 1 for a = 1)
arg max
z2[1;(2)]\F (1)
V 
1
minM1
(z)  2; 1 (2) . (A10)
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Let
b 2 arg max
z2[2;(2)]\F (1)
V 
1
minM1
(z) (A11)
and dene 0 : S ! S by
0 (s) =

b if s = 1
1 (s) if s > 1
; (A12)
let us prove that 0 is a MVE. Notice that (A10) and (A11) imply
V 
1
minM1
(b) > V 
1
minM1
(1) .
By Lemma 2, since b > 1,
V 
1
(b) >1 V
1 (1) . (A13)
Notice, however, that
V 
1
(1) = u (1) = (1  ) ,
and also V 
1
(b) = V 
1
2 (b); therefore, (A13) may be rewritten as
V 
1
2 (b) >1 u (1) = (1  ) .
By Lemma 5, 0 : S ! S dened by (A12), is a MVE.
Second, suppose that f (m  1) = 3. In this case, using the rst part of Lemma 5, we can
prove that there is a MVE similarly to the previous case.
Finally, suppose that f (1) = 3 and f (m  1) = 2 (this already implies m  3), then there
is a 2 [2;m  1] such that f (a  1) = 3 and f (a) = 2. Dene, for s 2 S n fag and i 2 N ,
V i (s) =
(
V
a 11
i (s) if s < a
V
a2
i (s) if s > a
.
Let us rst prove that there exists b 2  a 11 (a  1) ; a  1 [ [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] \ F (a) such
that
V  (b) >a u (a) = (1  ) , (A14)
and let B be the set of such b (so B   a 11 (a  1) ; a  1 [ [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] \ F (a)).
Indeed, since f (a  1) = 3,
arg max
z2[a 1(a 1);a 1(a)]\F (a)
V 
a 1
maxMa
(z)  a 1 (a  1) ; a  1 . (A15)
Let
b 2 arg max
z2[a 1(a 1);a 1]\F (a)

V 
a 1
maxMa
(z)

, (A16)
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then (A15) and (A16) imply
V 
a 1
maxMa
(b) > V 
a 1
maxMa
(a) . (A17)
By Lemma 2, since b < a,
V 
a 1
(b) >a V
a 1 (a) . (A18)
We have, however,
V 
a 1
(a) = V 
a 1
2 (a) = u (a) + V 
a 1
2
 
a 12 (a)
 a u (a) + V a 12 (a) = u (a) + V a 1 (a)
(V 
a 1
(a) = V 
a 1
2 (a) by denition of a 1, and the inequality holds because a 12 is MVE on
[a;m]). Consequently, (A17) and (A18) imply (A14). (Notice that using f (a) = 2, we could
similarly prove that there is b 2 [a+ 1; a (a+ 1)] such that (A14) holds.)
Let us now take state some quasi-median voter in state a, j 2Ma, and state d 2 B such that
d = arg max
b2B
V j (b) , (A19)
and dene monotone mapping  : S ! S as
 (s) =
8<:
a 11 (s) if s < a
d if s = a
a2 (s) if s > a
(note that V  (s) = V  (s) for x 6= a). Let us prove that  is a MVE on S.
By construction of d (A19), we have that b 2 a 11 (a  1) ; a2 (a+ 1) \ F (a),
V  (b) a V  (d) .
This is automatically true for b 2 B, whereas if b =2 F (a) n B and b 6= a, the opposite would
imply
V  (b) >a u (a) = (1  ) ,
which would contradict b =2 B; nally, if b = a,
V  (a) >a V
 (d)
is impossible, as this would imply
u (a) >a (1  )V  (d)
contradicting (A14), given the denition of d (A19). Now, Lemma 5 implies that 0 = j[1;a] is
a MVE on [1; a].
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Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that  is not MVE. Since  is made from MVE 0 on
[1; a] and MVE a2 on [a+ 1;m], properties 1 and 3 of Denition 3 are satised, and by Lemma
4 there are only two possible monotone deviations that may prevent  from being MVE. First,
suppose that for some y 2 [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] \ F (a),
V  (y) >a V
 (d) . (A20)
However, this would contradict (A19) (and if y =2 B, then (A20) is impossible as d 2 B). The
second possibility is that for some y 2 [d; a],
V  (y) >a+1 V
 (a2 (a+ 1)) .
This means that
V maxMa+1 (y) > V

maxMa+1
(a2 (a+ 1)) .
At the same time, for any x 2 [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] \ F (a), we have
V maxMa+1 (x)  V

maxMa+1
(a2 (a+ 1))
(otherwise Lemma 2 would imply a protable deviation to x). This implies that for any such x,
V maxMa+1 (y) > V

maxMa+1
(x) .
Now, recall that
a1 2 arg max
2[1;a];z2[(a);a]\F (a)
V maxMa+1 (z) .
This means that there is z 2 [a1 (a) ; a] \ F (a) such that
V
a1
maxMa+1
(z)  V maxMa+1 (y) ,
and thus for any x 2 [a+ 1; a2 (a+ 1)] \ F (a),
V
a1
maxMa+1
(z) > V maxMa+1 (x) .
But a1 = 
a on the left-hand side, and  = a on the right-hand side. We therefore have that
the following maximum is achieved on [a (a) ; a]:
arg max
z2[a(a);a(a+1)]\F (a)
V 
a
maxMa+1
(z)  [a (a) ; a] ,
i.e., that [3] in Lemma 4 holds. But this contradicts that f (a) = 2. This contradiction completes
the induction step, which proves existence of MVE.
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Finally, suppose that  is a monotone MVE; take any s0. If  (s0)  s0, then monotonicity
implies 2 (s0)   (s0) etc, and thus the sequence

k (s0)
	
is weakly increasing in k. It must
therefore have a limit. A similar reasoning applies if  (s0) < s0, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Part 1. Suppose that there are two MVE 1 and 2. Without loss
of generality, assume that m is the minimal number of states for which this is possible, i.e., if
jSj < m, then transition mapping is unique. Obviously, m  2.
Consider the set Z = fx 2 S j 1 (x) 6= 2 (x)g, and denote a = minZ, b = maxZ. Without
loss of generality, assume that 1 and 2 are enumerated such that 1 (a) < 2 (a).
Let us rst prove the following auxiliary result: a < m; b > 1; if x 2 [max f2; ag ; b], then
1 (x) < x  2 (x); if x 2 [a;min fb;m  1g], then 1 (x)  x < 2 (x).
To do this, we rst show that if 1 (x) = x, then x = 1 or x = m. Indeed, assume the
opposite and consider 2 (x). If 2 (x) < x, then 1j[1;x] 6= 2j[1;x] are two MVE for the set of
states [1; x], which contradicts the choice of m. If 2 (x) > x, we get a similar contradiction for
[x;m], and if 2 (x) = x, we get a contradiction by considering [1; x] if a < x and [x;m] if a > x.
Similarly, if 2 (x) = x, then either x = 1 or x = m.
Now assume, to obtain a contradiction, that a = m. Then Z = fmg, so 1j[1;m 1] =
2j[1;m 1], and then having 1 (m) 6= 2 (m) is impossible for generic parameter values. We
would get a similar contradiction if b = 1, which proves that a < m and b > 1, thus proving the
rst part of the auxiliary result.
Let us now show that for x 2 [a; b] n f1;mg, we have that either 1 (x) < x < 2 (x) or
2 (x) < x < 1 (x). Indeed, neither 1 (x) = x nor 2 (x) = x is possible. If 1 (x) < x and
2 (x) < x, then 1j[1;x] and 2j[1;x] are two di¤erent MVE on [1; x], which is impossible; we get
a similar contradiction if 1 (x) > x and 2 (x) > x. This also implies that if a < x < b, then
x 2 Z.
We now prove that for any x 2 Z, 1 (x) < 2 (x). Indeed, suppose that 2 (x) > 1 (x)
(equality is impossible as x 2 Z); then x > a  1. If x < m, then, as we proved, we must have
2 (x) < x < 1 (x), and if x = m, then 2 (x) < 1 (x)  m = x. In either case, 2 (x) < x, and
since 2 (a) > 1 (a)  1, then by monotonicity of 2 there must be y : 1  a < y < x  m such
that 2 (y) = y, but we proved that this is impossible. Hence, 1 (x) < 2 (x) for any x 2 Z,
and using the earlier result, we have 1 (x) < x < 2 (x) for any x 2 Z n f1;mg.
To nish the proof, it su¢ ces to show that 1 (1) = 1 and 2 (m) = m. Suppose, to obtain a
contradiction, that 1 (1) > 1. We then have 2 (1) > 1, then 1 (2)  2 and 2 (2)  2 and thus
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1j[2;m] and 2j[2;m] are MVE on [2;m], and since b 6= 1, they must be di¤erent, which would
again contradict the choice of m. We would get a similar contradiction if 2 (m) = m. This
completes the proof of the auxiliary result.
To nish the proof of the Theorem, notice that the auxiliary result implies, in particular,
that Z = [a; b] \ S, so Z has no gaps. We dene function g : Z ! f1; 2g as follows. If
V
1
Mx
(x) > V
2
Mx
(x), then g (x) = 1, and if V 2Mx (x) > V
1
Mx
(x), then g (x) = 2; the exact equality
cannot hold generically. Intuitively g picks the equilibrium (left or right) that agent Mx prefers.
Let us prove that g (a) = 2 and g (b) = 1. Indeed, suppose that g (a) = 1; since a < m, we
must have 1 (a)  a < 2 (a) (with equality if a = 1 and strict inequality otherwise). Consider
two cases. If a > 1, then for x < a, 1 (x) = 2 (x), and since 1 (a) < a, then V
1
Ma
(1 (a) j a) =
V
2
Ma
(1 (a) j a). But V 1Mx (x) > V
2
Mx
(x) implies that V 1Ma (1 (a) j a) > V
2
Ma
(2 (a) j a) (pro-
vided that  6= 0), and thus V 2Ma (1 (a) j a) > V
2
Ma
(2 (a) j a), which contradicts that 2 is
MVE. If a = 1, then g (a) = 1 would imply that V 1M1 (1) > V
2
M1
(1). But 1 (1) = 1, which means
uM1 (1)
1  > V
2
M1
(1), thus uM1 (1) +V
2
M1
(1) > V
2
M1
(1). But V 2M1 (1) = uM1 (1) +V
2
M1
(2 (1) j 1),
and thus, provided that  6= 0, we have V 2M1 (1 j 1) > V
2
M1
(2 (1) j 1). This contradicts that 2
is an MVE, thus proving that g (a) = 2. We can similarly prove that g (b) = 1.
Clearly, there must be two states s; s+ 1 2 Z such that g (s) = 2 and g (s+ 1) = 1. For such
s; let us construct mapping  as follows:
 (x) =

1 (x) if x  s
2 (x) if x > s
;
then  (s)  s < 2 (s) (inequality is strict unless s = 1) and  (s+ 1)  s + 1 >
 (s) (inequality is strict unless s + 1 = m), which means that mapping  is monotone.
Now, g (s) = 2 implies that uMs (x) + V
2
Ms
(2 (s) j s) = V 2Ms (s) > V
1
Ms
(s) = uMs (x) +
V
1
Ms
(1 (s) j s). But V 2Ms (2 (s) j s) = V

Ms
(2 (s) j s) and V 1Ms (1 (s) j s) = V

Ms
(1 (s) j s),
and thus V Ms (2 (s) j s) > V

Ms
(1 (s) j s) (note also that s+1  2 (s)  2 (s+ 1)). Similarly,
g (s+ 1) = 1 implies V Ms+1 (1 (s+ 1) j s+ 1) > V

Ms+1
(2 (s+ 1) j s+ 1). But this contradicts
Lemma 4 for mapping . This contradiction completes the proof.
Part 2. As in Part 1, we can assume that m is the minimal number of states for which
this is possible. We can then establish, similarly to Part 1, that if 1 (x) = x, then x = 1 or
x = m. If 1 (x) < x < 2 (x) or vice versa, then for all i 2 Mx, there must be both a state
x1 < x and a state x2 > x such that ui (x1) > ui (x) and ui (x2) > ui (x), which contradicts
the assumption in this case. Since for 1 < x < m,  (x) 6= x, we get that 1 (x) = 2 (x) for
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such x. Let us prove that 1 (1) = 2 (1). If this is not the case, then 1 (1) = 1 and 2 (1) = 2
(or vice versa). If m = 2, then monotonicity implies 2 (2) = 2, and if m > 2, then, as proved
earlier, we must have 2 (x) = x + 1 for 1 < x < m and 2 (m) = m. In both cases, we have
1 (x) = 2 (x) > 1 for 1 < x  m. Hence, V 1i (2) = V 2i (2) for all i 2 N . Since 1 is
MVE, we must have ui (1) = (1  )  V 1i (2) for i 2 M1, and since 2 is MVE, we must have
V 2i (2)  ui (1) = (1  ). Generically, this cannot hold, and this proves that 1 (1) = 2 (1).
We can likewise prove that 1 (m) = 2 (m), which implies that 1 = 2. This contradicts the
hypothesis of non-uniqueness. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The existence is proved in the text. Since, on equilibrium path,
there is only a nite number of shocks, then from some period t on, the environment will be the
same, say Ex. Since Ex is monotone, the sequence fstg has a limit by Theorem 1. The fact
that this limit may depend on the sequence of shocks realization is shown by Example 5. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Part 1. Without loss of generality, suppose that h is the minimal
number for which two monotone MVE  = fEgE2E and 0 =

0E
	
E2E exist. If we take
~E = fE2; : : : ; Ehg with the same environments E2; : : : ; Eh and the same transition probabilities,
we will (generically) have a unique monotone MVE ~ = fEgE2E 0 =

0E
	
E2E 0 by assumption.
Now, with the help of transformation used in the proof of 3 we get that E1 and 
0
E1 must
be MVE in a certain stationary environment E0. However, by Theorem 2 such MVE is unique,
which leads to a contradiction.
Part 2. The proof is similar to that of Part 1. The only step is that we need to verify that
we can apply Part 2 of Theorem 2 to the stationary environment E0. In general, this will not
be the case. However, it is easy to notice (by examining the proof of Part 2 of Theorem 2) that
instead of single-peakedness, we could require a weaker condition: that for each s 2 S there is
i 2Ms such that there do not exist x < s and y > s such that ui (x)  ui (s) and ui (y)  ui (s).
We can now prove that if fui (s)gs2Si2N satisfy this property and  is MVE, then
n
V i (s)
os2S
i2N
also does. Indeed, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some s 2 S, for all i 2 Ms there
are xi < s and yi > s such that V

i (xi)  V i (s) and V i (yi)  V i (s); without loss of generality,
we may assume that xi and yi minimize jxi   sj and jyi   sj among such xi and yi.
Consider the case  (s) > s. This implies that for all i 2 Ms, there is a > s such that
ui (a) > ui (s), and therefore for all i 2Ms and all a < s, ui (z) < ui (s). Moreover, for all i 2Ms,
ui (z) < V

i (s) = (1  ). Take j = maxMs, and let z = xj . We cannot have  (z)  z, because
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then V j ( (z))  V j (s) would be impossible. Thus,  (z) > z, and in this case we must have
 (z) > s, To see this, notice that V j (z) = uj (z)+V

j ( (z)). If  (z) < s, then V

j (z)  V j (s)
and uj (z) < V

i (s) = (1  ), implying V j ( (z)) > V j (s) and thus contradicting the choice
of z = xj . If  (z) = s, then V

j (z) = uj (z) + V

j ( (z)) contradicts V

j (z)  V j (s) and
uj (z) < V

i (s) = (1  ). Consequently,  (z) > s. Monotonicity of  implies s <  (z)   (s).
Now, V j (z)  V j (s) and uj (z) < uj (s) implies V j ( (z)) > V j ( (s)) (and in particular,
 (z) <  (s)). Since j = maxMs, we have V  ( (z)) >s V  ( (s)). Since s <  (z) <  (s),
 (z) 2 Fs, and therefore a deviation in s from  (s) to  (z) is feasible and protable. This
contradicts that  is a MVE. We would get a similar contradiction if we assumed that  (s) < s.
Finally, assume  (s) = s. Then take any i 2 Ms, and suppose, without loss of generality,
that for any a < s, ui (a) < ui (s). Then, since for all such a, k (s)  s for all k  1, we must
have V i (a) < V

i (s), which contradicts the assertion. This proves the auxiliary result.
We have thus proved that under the assumptions of the Theorem, the environment con-
structed in the proof of 3 satises the requirements Part 2 of Theorem 2. The rest of the proof
follows immediately. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Part 1. It su¢ ces to prove this result for stationary case. For
each s 2 S take any protocol such that if  (s) 6= s, then s (jFsj   1) =  (s) (i.e., the desired
transition is the last one to be considered). We claim that there is a strategy prole  such that
if for state s,  (s) = s, then no alternative is accepted, and if  (s) 6= s, then no alternative is
accepted until the last stage, and in this last stage, the alternative  (s), is accepted.
Indeed, under such prole, the continuation strategies are given by (4). To show that such
outcome is possible in equilibrium, consider rst periods where  (s) 6= s. Consider the subgame
reached if no alternatives were accepted before the last one. Since by property 3 of Denition
3, V  ( (s)) s V  (s), it is a best response for players to accept  (s). Let us now show,
by backward induction, that if stage k, 1  k  jFsj   1 is reached without any alternatives
accepted, then there is an equilibrium where  (s) is accepted in the last stage. The base was
just proved. The induction step follows from the following: if at stage k, alternative y = s (k)
is under consideration, then accepting it yields a vector of payo¤s V  (y), and rejecting it yields,
by induction, V  ( (s)). Since by property 2 of Denition 3, V  (y) s V  ( (s)), it is a best
response to reject the alternative y. Consequently,  (s) will be accepted by induction. This
proves the induction step, and therefore  (s) is the outcome in a period which started with
s. Now consider a period where  (s) = s. By backward induction, we can prove that there
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is an equilibrium where no proposal is accepted. Indeed, the last proposal s (jFsj   1) may be
rejected, because V  (s (jFsj   1)) s V  (s) by property 2 of Denition 3. Going backward, if
for some stage k, s is the outcome once s (k) was rejected, su¢ ciently many players may reject
s (k), because V  (s (k)) s V  (s). This proves that in periods where  (s) = s, it is possible
to have an equilibrium where no proposal is accepted. Combining the equilibrium strategies
for di¤erent initial s in the beginning of the period, we get a MPE which induces transition
mappings  (s).
Part 2. If the transition mapping is monotone, then continuation utilities
n
V E;i (s)
os2S
i2N
=n
V E;i (s)
os2S
i2N
satisfy increasing di¤erences for any E 2 E . Again, the proof that  is MVE
reduces to the stationary case. For each state s, we consider the set Js  f1; : : : ; jFsj   1g of
stages k where the alternative under consideration, s (k), is accepted if this stage is reached.
Naturally,  (s) = s if and only if Js = ?, and if Js 6= ?, then  (s) = s (min Js). Moreover, one
can easily prove by induction that for any j; k 2 Js such that j  k, V  (s (j)) s V  (s (k))
and for any j 2 Js, V  (s (j)) s V  (s).
Take any s 2 S. Property 1 of Denition 3 holds trivially, because only states in Fs are
considered as alternatives and may be accepted. Let us show that property 2 holds. First,
consider the case  (s) = s. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some y 2 Fs, V  (y) >s
V  (s). Suppose that this y is considered at stage k. But then, if stage k is reached, a winning
coalition of players must accept y, because rejecting it leads to s. Then k 2 Js, contradicting
Js = ? for such s. Second, consider the case  (s) 6= s. Again, suppose that for some y 2 Fs,
V  (y) >s V
 ( (s)); notice that y 6= s, because V  ( (s)) = V  (s (min Js)) s V  (s). Let
k be the stage where y is considered. If k < min Js, so y is considered before  (s), then a
winning coalition must accept y, which implies k 2 Js, contradicting k < min Js. If, on the
other hand, k > min Js, then notice that k =2 Js (otherwise, V  (y) >s V  ( (s)) is impossible).
If k > max Js, then we have V  (y) >s V  ( (s)) = V  (s (min Js)) s V  (s), which means
that this proposal must be accepted, so k 2 Js, a contradiction. If k < max Js, then we can take
l = min fJs \ [k + 1; jFsj   1]g. Since V  (y) >s V  ( (s)) = V  (s (min Js)) s V  (s (l)), it
must again be that y is accepted, so k 2 Js, again a contradiction. In all cases, the assertion
that such y exists leads to a contradiction, which completes the proof.
Finally, we need to show that Property 3 of Denition 3 holds. This is trivial if  (s) = s.
Otherwise, we already proved that for all j 2 Js, V  (s (j)) s V  (s). In particular, this is
true for j = min Js. Consequently, V  ( (s)) s V  (s). This completes the proof that  is a
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MVE. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that 2 (x) < x. Then 1jS0
and 2jS0 are mappings from S0 to S0 such that both are MVE. Moreover, they are di¤erent,
as 1 (x) = x > 2 (x). However, this would violate the assumed uniqueness (either assumption
needed for Theorem 2 continues to hold if the domain is restricted), which completes the proof.

Proof of Corollary 1. Consider an alternative set of environments E 0 = fE0; E2g, where
E0 coincides with E2 on S, but the transition probabilities are the same as in E . Clearly, 0
such that 0E0 = 
0
E2 = E2 is a MVE in E 0. Let us now consider stationary environments ~E0
and ~E1 obtained from E 0 and E , respectively, using the procedure from the proof of Theorem
3. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that E2 (x) < x, then environments
~E0 and ~E1 coincide
on [1; s] by construction. Theorem 6 then implies that, since E1 (x) = x, then 
0
E0 (x)  x
(since 0E0 and E1 are the unique MVE in ~E0 and ~E1, respectively). But by denition of 
0,
x < 0E0 (x) = E2 (x)  x, a contradiction. This contradiction completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Let us rst prove this result for the case where each QMV is a
singleton. Both before and after the shock, the mapping that would map any state x to a
state which maximizes the stage payo¤ uMx (y) would be a monotone MVE for  < 0. By
uniqueness, E1 and E2 would be these mappings under E1 and E2, respectively. Now it is
clear that if the shock arrives at period t, and the state at the time of shock is x = st 1, then
E2 (x) must be either the same as E1 (x) or must satisfy E2 (x) > s. In either case, we get a
monotone sequence after the shock. Moreover, the sequence is the same if s  s, and if s > s,
then we have s > s  ~s automatically.
The general case may be proved by observing that a mapping that maps each state x to
an alternative which maximizes by uminMx (y) among the states such that ui (y)  ui (x) for
all i 2 Mx is a monotone MVE. Such mapping is generically unique, and by the assumption of
uniqueness it coincides with the mapping E1 if the environment is E1 and it coincides with E2
if the environment is E2. The remainder of the proof is analogous. 
Proof of Theorem 8. It is su¢ cient, by transitivity, to prove this Theorem for the case
where maxME1;x 6= maxME2;x for only one state x 2 [s+ 1;m]. Moreover, without loss of
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generality, we can assume that maxME1;x < maxME2;x. Notice that if 1 (x)  x, then 1 is
MVE in environment E2, and by uniqueness must coincide with 2.
Consider the remaining case 1 (x) < x; it implies 1 (x  1)  x 1. Consequently, 1j[1;x 1]
is MVE under either environment restricted on [1; x  1] (they coincide on this interval). Sup-
pose, to obtain a contradiction, that 1j[1;s] 6= 2j[1;s]; since x > s, we have 1j[1;x 1] 6= 2j[1;x 1].
We must then have 2 (x  1) > x 1 (otherwise there would be two MVE 1j[1;x 1] and 2j[1;x 1]
on [1; x  1], and therefore 2 (x)  x. Consequently, 2j[x;m] is MVE on [x;m] under environ-
ment E2 restricted on [x;m]. Let us prove that 2j[x;m] is MVE on [x;m] under environment
E1 restricted on [x;m] as well. Indeed, if it were not the case, then there must be a monotone
deviation, as fewer QMV (in state x) imply that only property 2 of Denition 3 may be vio-
lated. Since under E1, state x has fewer quasi-median voters than under E2, it is only possible
if 2 (x) > x, in which case 2 (x+ 1)  x + 1. Then 2j[x+1;m] would be MVE on [x+ 1;m],
and by Lemma 5 we could get MVE ~2 on [x;m] under environment E1. This MVE ~2 would
be MVE on [x;m] under environment E2. But then under environment E2 we have two MVE,
~2 and 2j[x;m] on [x;m], which is impossible.
We have thus shown that 1j[1;x 1] is MVE on [1; x  1] under both E1 and E2, and the same
is true for 2j[x;m] on [x;m]. Take mapping  given by
 (y) =

1 (y) if y < x
2 (y) if y > x
.
Since 1j[1;x 1] 6= 2j[1;x 1] and 1j[x;m] 6= 2j[x;m] (1 (x  1)  x   1, 2 (x  1) > x   1,
1 (x) < x, 2 (x)  x),  is not MVE in E1 nor it is in E2. By Lemma 4, in both E1 and
E2 only one type of monotone deviation (at x   1 to some z 2 [x; 2 (x)] or at x to some
z 2 [1 (x  1) ; x]) is possible. But the payo¤s under the rst deviation are the same under
both E1 and E2; hence, in both environments it is the same type of deviation.
Suppose that it is the former deviation, at x   1 to some z 2 [x; 2 (x)]. Consider the
following restriction on feasible transitions:
~F (a) =

F (a) if a  x;
F (a) \ [1; x  1] if a < x;
denote the resulting environments by E1 and E2. This makes the deviation impossible, and thus
 is MVE in E1 (in E2 as well). However, 1 is also MVE in E1, as it is not a¤ected by the
change is feasibility of transitions, and this contradicts uniqueness. Finally, suppose that the
deviation is at x to some z 2 [1 (x  1) ; x]. Then consider the following restriction on feasible
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transitions:
F (a) =

F (a) if a < x;
F (a) \ [x;m] if a  x;
denote the resulting environments by E1 and E2. This makes the deviation impossible, and thus
 is MVE in E2. However, 2 is also MVE in E1, as it is not a¤ected by the change in feasibility.
Again, this contradicts uniqueness, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. We start by proving that there exists a unique monotone
MVE. To show this, we need to establish that all requirements for existence and generic unique-
ness are satised.
(Increasing di¤erences) Consider player i and take two states x; y with x > y. The policy in
state x is bMx and in state y, it is bMy . Since Mx My and b is increasing in the identity of the
player, we have bMx  bMy . Take the di¤erence
ui (x)  ui (y) =   (bMx   bi)2  
X
j =2Hx
jCj  

   bMy   bi2  Xj =2Hy jCj

=
 
bMx   bMy
  
2bi   bMx   bMy
 X
j =2Hx
jCj +
X
j =2Hy
jCj .
This only depends on i through bi, which is increasing in bi. Hence, increasing di¤erences is
satised.
(Monotone QMV) The QMV in state s is Ms. If s  0, then an increase in s implies that
players on the right get more power, and s  0, then a decrease in s implies that players on the
left get more power.
(Feasibility) All transitions are feasible, and thus the assumption holds trivially.
(QMV are singletons) This holds generically, when no two disjoint sets of players have the
same power.
This establishes that there is a unique monotone MVE. To show that  (0) = 0, suppose not.
Without loss of generality,  (0) > 0. Then if s1 = 0, monotonicity implies that st > 0 for all
t > 1. But M0 = 0, thus bM0 = b0 and uM0 (0) = 0, while uM0 (s) < 0 for s 6= 0. This shows
that if  (0) > 0, there is a protable deviation to 0. This contradiction completes the proof.
Part 2. Consider the case s < 0 (the case s > 0 is considered similarly). Since  (0) = 0,
monotonicity implies that  (s)  0. To show that  (s)  s, suppose, to obtain a contradiction,
that  (s) < s. Then, starting from the initial state s1 = s, the equilibrium path will involve
st < s for all t > 1. Notice, however, that for the QMV Ms, uMs (s) =  
P
j =2Hs jCj , and
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for x < s, uMs (x) =   (bMx   bMs)  
P
j =2Hx jCj < uMs (s), as Hx is a strict superset of Hs.
Again, there is a protable deviation, which completes the proof.
Part 3. Consider the mapping  such that  (s) = 0 for all s. Under this mapping,
continuation utilities are given by
V i (s) =   (bMs   bi)2   k
X
j =2Hs
jC

j  

1   (b0   bi)
2 .
Now, the two conditions required to hold for  to be an MVE simplify to:
for any s; x : V Ms (0)  V

Ms
(x) ;
for any s : V Ms (0)  V

Ms
(s) ;
clearly, the second line of inequalities is a subset of the rst. This simplies to
for any s; x: k
X
j =2Hx
jC

j  (bMs)2   (bMx   bMs)2 .
Clearly, as k increases, the number of equations that are true weakly increases. Furthermore,
for k high enough, the left-hand side becomes arbitrarily large for all x except for x = 0 where it
remains zero, but for x = 0, bMx = 0 and thus the right-hand side is zero as well. Finally, if k is
small enough, the left-hand side is arbitrarily close to 0 for all s and x, and thus the inequality
will be violated, e.g., for s = x = 1. This proves that there is a unique positive k with the
required property. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1. The equilibrium exists and is unique because the
required properties hold in each of the environments, and thus Theorems 3 and 4 are applicable.
Let Ef be the mapping after radicals have left. Since the environment Ef allows for no fur-
ther stochastic shocks, Ef coincides with  from Proposition 1 (i.e., if radicals are impossible).
Now take any radical environment Rz (so states x  z are controlled by radicals). Notice that
Rz (s) is the same for all s  z (otherwise, setting Rz (s) = Rz (z) for all s < z would yield
another MVE, thus violating uniqueness). Consider two situations: z < 0 and z  0.
Suppose rst that z < 0. Then Rz (0) = 0 (similar to the proof of Part 1 of Proposition
1), and thus by monotonicity Rz (s) 2 [ l   r; 0]. For any x such that z < x < 0, Rz (x)  x
(again, similar to that proof). Notice that as b l varies, the mapping Rz j[z+1;l+r] does not
change. Indeed, equilibrium paths starting from x  z + 1 remain within that range, and thus
continuation utilities of Mx for any x  z+ 1 do not depend on b l; moreover, a deviation from
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x  z+ 1 to some y  z cannot be protable for obvious reasons. The state Rz (z) is such that
it maximizes the continuation utility of the radical  l among the following alternaties: moving
to some state y  z, staying there until transition to environment Ef and moving according to
Ef , and moving to some state y > z, moving according to Rz until the transition to Ef and
according to Ef after the transition. Notice that as b l decreases, the continuation utilities of
the radical  l under all these options, except of moving to state y =  l   r, strictly decrease,
while the payo¤ of that option remains unchanged (and equal to   11 k
P
j> l jC

j ). Hence, a
decrease in b l makes this transition more likely starting from state z, and thus for all s  z.
Now suppose that z  0. Trivially, we must have Rz (z)  0. In this case, Rz j[z+1;l+r]
may depend on b l, moving to y 2 [z + 1; l + r] is suboptimal for the radical anyway. So in this
case, the equilibrium Rz (z) maximizes the radicals continuation utility among the options of
moving to some y  0, staying there until transition to Ef , and then moving according to Ef .
Again, only for y =  l  r the continuation payo¤ remains unchanged as b l decreases, and for
all other options it decreases. Hence, in this case, too, a lower b l makes Rz (z) =  l  r more
likely. Moreover, since the equilibrium path starting from any y  0 will only feature states
s  0, and for all possible y  0, the path for lower y is rst-order stochastically dominated by
the path for higher y, an increase in k makes Rz (z) =  l   r less likely.
It remains to prove that an increase in z decreases the chance of transition to  l  r for any
given s  z. This is equivalent to saying that a higher z decreases the chance that Rz ( l   r) =
 l r. Suppose that z increases by one. If z  0 (thus increasing to z+1  1), then Rz ( l   r)
does not change as moving to y  1 was dominated anyway. If z < 0 (thus increasing to
z + 1  0), then this increase does not change Rz j[z+2;l+r], and thus the only change is the
option to stay in z + 1 as long as the shock leading to Ef does not arrive. This makes staying
in  l   r weakly less attractive for the radical, and for some parameter values may make him
switch.
Part 2. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some s  0, E1 (s) < s. Without loss of
generality we may assume that this is the lowest such s, meaning E1 (s) is E1-stable. Consider
a deviation at s from E1 (s) to s. This deviation has the following e¤ect on continuation
utility. First, in the period of deviation, the QMV Ms gets a higher state payo¤. Second, the
continuation utilities if a transition to Rz for some z takes place immediately after that may
di¤er (if there is no shock, then both paths will converge at E1 (s) thus yielding the same
continuation utilities). Now consider two cases: if z  s, then the radicals are in power in both
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s and E1 (s). As showed in the proof of Part 1, the radicals will transit to the same state, thus
resulting in the same path and continuation utilities. If, however, z < s, then the transition in
Rz will be chosen by Ms if he stayed in s, hence, this transition will maximize his continuation
payo¤ under Rz, and this need not be true if he moved to E1 (s) (regardless of whether or not
radicals rule in this state). In all cases, the continuation utility after the current period is weakly
higher if he stayed in s than if he moved to E1 (s) < s, and taking into account the rst e¤ect,
we have a strictly protable deviation. This contradicts the denition of MVE, which completes
the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that E1 (s)  x for
all x  0. By Part 2 of Proposition 2, E1 (s)  s for s  0, which now implies E1 (0) = 0.
Part 2. As in Theorem 3, we may treat the environment E1 as static, with Wi (s) as
quasi-utilities and ~ =  (1  ) as the discount factor. Assume, to obtain a contradiction,
that for all x  0, E1 (s)  s. The payo¤ from staying in 0 for player M0 = 0 is V0 (0) =
W0(0)
1 ~ . By denition of MVE, VMs
 
E1 (s)
  VMs (s), and since continuation utilities satisfy
increasing di¤erences, E1 (s)  s, and M0  Ms, it must be that V0
 
E1 (s)
  V0 (s). Since
V0 (s) = W0 (s) + ~V0
 
E1 (s)

, we have V0
 
E1 (s)
  W0(s)
(1 ~) . Consequently, it must be that
V0
 
E1 (s)

> V0 (0). This is impossible if E1 (s) = 0, and it suggests a protable deviation at
0 from 0 to s otherwise. This contradiction proves that such x exists.
Part 3. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some s > 0, E1 (s) > s.
Without loss of generality, assume that E1 (s) is itself E1-stable. By denition of MVE,
VMs
 
E1 (s)
  VMs (s). This is equivalent to WMs(E1 (s))1 ~  WMs (s) + ~WMs(E1 (s))1 ~ , thus
implying WMs
 
E1 (s)
  WMs (s). Setting y = E1 (s) and x = s, we have y > x  0 and
WMx (y) WMx (x), a contradiction. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Proposition 1 proved this result for environment Ef . For any
of the radical environments Rz (z < 0), the quasi-utility of the QMV of state 0, player 0, is
~uRz ;0 (0) = 0, and for s 6= 0, ~uRz ;0 (s) < 0. This means that continuation utility ~VRz ;0 (s) < 0.
Hence, if Rz (0) = s 6= 0, there would be a protable deviation at 0 from s to 0; this proves
that Rz (0) = 0. Now, monotonicity yields that Rz (s)  s for all s  0. This tells us that
if we consider Rzj[0;l+r] to be a static environment with quasi-utilities ~uRz ;i (s) and the quasi-
discount factor ~ =  (1  ), then Rz j[0;l+r] is an MVE. But notice that Ef j[0;l+r] is also an
MVE in this environment, because continuation utilities ~VRz ;i (s) would equal the corresponding
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continuation utilities in the environment Ef , where it is an MVE: ~VRz ;i (s) = VEf ;i (s). Since
the MVE must be unique, we have Rz j[0;l+r] = Ef j[0;l+r], and thus Rz (s) 2 [0; s] for s  0,
because this property holds for Ef . Another iteration of this argument would establish the
same for the initial environment E1, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5. This is an immediate corollary of Theorem 6. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Part 1. Suppose not; so there are s  0 such that E1 (s) = 0
and Ef (s) 6= 0. Since Ef (0) = 0, we must have s > 0 and Ef (s) > 0. Without loss of
generality, assume that s is the minimal of such s > 0. If Ef (s) > 0, it must be that there is
some x > 0 such that uMs (x)  uMs (0), and generically, this means that uMs (x) > uMs (0).
Moreover, there is such x that satises 0 < x  s (because for x > 0, uMs (x) < uMs (s)). But
then E1 (x) = 0; this implies that in environment E1 and state s, a deviation from 0 to x is
protable for group Ms. This contradiction completes the proof.
Part 2. Let us rst prove that for any Rz and any x  0, Rz (x)  x. Suppose, to obtain a
contradiction, that Rz (x) > x  0. Consider two cases. If z  x (so radicals are in power), then
at x they have a protable deviation from Rz (x) to x, since the path starting at x is rst-order
stochastically dominated by one starting at Rz (x) > x, both are contained in [0; l + r], and
on this set the preferences are radicals are monotone. Consequently, in this case, Rz (x) > x
is impossible. The second case is z < x, meaning that Mx is the QMV. In that case deviation
to x is again protable: indeed, VEf ;Mx (x) is maximal among all VEf ;Mx (y) for y  x, and the
path Rz (x) ; 
2
Rz (x) ; : : : yields, pointwisely, lower utility than the path x; Rz (x) ; 
2
Rz (x) ; : : :.
This shows that Rz (x)  x.
Now suppose that x  0 is stable in E. Then it does not change if a shock never arrives,
and the result holds trivially. Once a transition to Rz has taken place, we have Rz (x)  x,
implying that the entire path satises this property. If there is never a transition to Ef , then
the statement again holds; otherwise, suppose that this shock arrives when the society is at
s  x. Since Ef (x)  x, we must have that Ef (s)  x, and so the entire path lies below x.
Convergence follows from niteness of S, and the ultimate state y satises y  x. 
Proof of Proposition 7. This result is a direct corollary of Theorem 8. 
Proof of Proposition 8. All the Assumptions hold for trivial reasons, however, we need
to verify that the increasing di¤erences (Assumption 2) hold when one of the agents is group
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 l. Take another group x >  l; we have
us (x)  us ( l) =

(bx   b l)
 
2bMs   bMx   bM l
  (1  )Pj =2Hs jCj if s < 0
(bx   b l)
 
2bMs   bMx   bM l

if s  0 .
But bMs is increasing in s, and
P
j =2Hs jCj is decreasing while remaining positive. This implies
that us (x)  us ( l) is increasing in s, so all Assumptions hold.
Take some  and 0 such that  > 0. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that E1 (0) > 0,
but 0E1 (0) = 0. Since radicals cannot come to power at state 1, we must have E1 (1) 2 f0; 1g,
and 0E1 (1) 2 f0; 1g. We therefore have E1 (0) = E1 (1) = 1.
It is easy to check that for any radical environment Rz and for any x  z, 0Rz (x)  Rz (x) 
0, and therefore, if in period t, the environment is Rz and the state is st = s0t  z, then for
all   t and for all realizations of shocks, we have s0  s  0. From this, we have that
VRz ;0 (0) = V
0
Rz ;0
(0) and VRz ;0 (1) = V
0
Rz ;0
(1) whenever z < 0 (indeed, the equilibrium paths in
these cases in Rz and Ef are the same and do not involve states x < 0).
Notice also that the mapping Rz j[0;r] = Ef j[0;r] for z < 0. Denote  =  l r   0, so 
is the probability of a shock to a radical environments other than R0.
Let us prove that E1 (0) = 1 implies R0 (0) = 1. Indeed, from E1 (0) = 1, we have
~uE1;0 (1)  ~uE1;0 (0). By denition,
~uE1;0 (1) = u0 (1) + 
 
VEf ;0 (1) + 0VR0;0 (1)

,
~uE1;0 (0) = u0 (0) + 
 
VEf ;0 (0) + 0VR0;0 (0)

.
But u0 (1) < u0 (0) and, clearly, VEf ;0 (1) < 0 = VEf ;0 (0). This means VR0;0 (1) > VR0;0 (0),
implying that R0 (0) = 1 (which in turn implies R0 (1) = 1).
Now, notice that we have similar formulas for ~uE1;0 (1) and ~uE1;0 (0), and moreover,
VEf ;0 (1) = V
0
Ef ;0
(1) and VEf ;0 (0) = V
0
Ef ;0
(0). Therefore,
~uE1;0 (1)  ~u0E1;0 (1) = 0
 
VR0;0 (1)  V 0R0;0 (1)

,
~uE1;0 (0)  ~u0E1;0 (0) = 0
 
VR0;0 (0)  V 0R0;0 (0)

.
But R0 (0) = R0 (1) = 1 implies VR0;0 (1) = V
0
R0;0
(1). On the other hand, VR0;0 (0)  V 0R0;0 (0).
Together, this all implies that 
~uE1;0 (1)  ~u0E1;0 (1)
   ~uE1;0 (0)  ~u0E1;0 (0)  0.
Since ~uE1;0 (1)  ~uE1;0 (0), it must be that ~u0E1;0 (1)  ~u0E1;0 (0). This means ~u0E1;M1 (1) 
~u0E1;M1 (0), implying 
0
E1 (1) = 1. But then ~u
0
E1;0
(1)  ~u0E1;0 (0) is incompatible with 0E1 (0) = 0.
This contradicts our initial assertion, which completes the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 9. Part 1. It su¢ ces to prove this result in stationary environments.
By Theorem 10, there are no cycles, and thus for any x 2 S, the sequence x;  (x) ; 2 (x) ; : : :
has a limit. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that MVE  is nonmonotone, which means
there are states x; y 2 S such that x < y and  (x) >  (y). Without loss of generality we can
assume that x and y are such that the set Z =

x;  (x) ; 2 (x) ; : : : ; y;  (y) ; 2 (y) ; : : :
	
has
fewest di¤erent states. In that case, mapping  is monotone on the set Z n fx; yg, which implies
that fV si gs2Znfx;ygi2N satises increasing di¤erences. By property 2 of Denition 3 applied to state
x, we get
VmaxMx ( (x))  VmaxMx ( (y)) , (A21)
and if we apply it to state y,
VminMy ( (y))  VminMy ( (x)) . (A22)
Since maxMx  minMy by assumption, (A21) implies
VminMy ( (x))  VminMy ( (y)) .
Since in the generic case inequalities are strict, this contradicts (A22).
Part 2. Again, consider stationary environments only. If  is nonmonotone, then for some
x; y 2 S we have x < y and  (x) >  (y), which in this case implies  (x) = y = x + 1 and
 (y) = x. But by Theorem 10, this is generically impossible. This contradiction completes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 10. Let us rst rule out cycles, where for some x,  (x) 6= x, but
k (x) = x for some k > 1. Without loss of generality, let k be the minimal one for which this
is true, and x be the highest element in the cycle. In this case, the we have, for any i 2 N ,
Vi (x)  Vi ( (x)) = ui (x) + Vi ( (x))  Vi ( (x)) = ui (x)  (1  )Vi ( (x))
=
Xk 1
j=1
(1  )j 1
1  k
 
ui (x)  ui
 
j (x)

,
which is increasing in i, since each term is increasing in i as x > j (x) for j = 1; : : : ; k  1. This
means that fVi (s)gs2f(x);xgi2N satises the increasing di¤erences. Because of that, property 3 of
Denition 3, when applied to state x, implies that Vi ( (x))  Vi (x) for all i 2 Mx. However,
if we take y = k 1 (x) (so  (y) = x), then property 2 of Denition 3 would imply that
Vi (x)  Vi ( (x)) for at least one i 2My. Increasing di¤erences implies that Vi (x)  Vi ( (x))
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for at least one i 2 Mx, and therefore for such i, Vi (x) = Vi ( (x)). Generically, this is
impossible, which implies that cycles are generically ruled out.
Now, to prove that any path is monotone, assume the opposite, and take x that generates
the shortest nonmonotone path (i.e., such that the sequence x;  (x) ; 2 (x) ; : : : has the fewest
di¤erent states). In that case, either  (x) > x, but 2 (x) <  (x) or vice versa; without loss
of generality consider the former case. Denote y =  (x); then the sequence y;  (y) ; 2 (y) ; : : :
is monotone by construction of x. Consequently, fVi (s)gs2fy;(y);
2(y);:::g
i2N satises increasing
di¤erences. By property 3 of Denition 3 applied to state y, for all i 2 My, Vi ( (y))  Vi (y).
This is true for all i 2Mx. However, property 2 of Denition 3, applied to state x, implies that,
generically, at least for one i 2 Mx, Vi (y) > Vi ( (y)). This contradiction completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 11. Take an increasing sequence of sets of points, S1  S2  S3     ,
so that
1[
i=1
Si is dense. For each Si, take MVE i. We know that i is a monotone function on Si;
let us complement it to a monotone (not necessarily continuous) function on S which we denote
by ~i for each i. Since ~i are monotone functions from a bounded set to a bounded set, there is
a subsequence ~ik which converges to some
~ pointwisely. (Indeed, we can pick a subsequence
which converges on S1, then a subsequence converging on S2 etc; then use a diagonal process.
After it ends, the set of points where convergence was not achieved is at most countable, so we
can repeat the diagonal procedure.) To show that ~ is a MVE, suppose not, then there are two
points x and y such that y is preferred to ~ (x) by all members of Mx. Here, we need to apply
a continuity argument and say that it means that the same is true for some points in some Si.
But this would yield a contradiction. 
Examples
Example 5 (Example where the limit state depends on the timing of shocks). There are
two environments, E1 and E2, with the probability of transition  (E1; E2) = 0:1. There are
two states A;B, and two players 1 and 2. In both environments, the decision-making rule is
dictatorship of player 1 in state A and dictatorship of player 2 in state B. All transitions are
feasible, and the discound factor is  = 0:9. Payo¤s are given by
E1 A B
1 5 20
2 20 30
,
E2 A B
1 30 20
2 20 30
.
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Then the mapping  is given by E1 (A;B) = (B;B); E2 (A;B) = (A;B). Suppose that s0 = 1.
Then, if the shock arrives in period t = 1, the limit state is A, and if the shock arrives later, the
limit state is B.
Example 6 (Example with single-peaked preferences and two MVE) There are three
states A;B;C, and two players 1 and 2. The decision-making rule is unanimity in state A and
dictatorship of player 2 in states B and C. Payo¤s are given by
A B C
1 2 25 20
2 1 20 25
Then 1 given by 1 (A;B;C) = (B;C;C) and 2 given by 2 (A;B;C) = (C;C;C) are both
MVE when the discount factor is any  2 [0; 1)
Example 7 (Continuation utilities need not satisfy single-peakedness) There are four
states and three players, player 1 is the dictator in state A, player 2 is the dictator in state B,
and player 3 is the dictator in states C and D. The payo¤s are given by the following matrix:
A B C D
1 20 30 90 30
2 5 20 85 90
3 5 25 92 99
.
All payo¤s are single-peaked. Suppose  = 0:5; then the unique equilibrium has  (A) = C,
 (B) =  (C) =  (D) = D. Let us compute the continuation payo¤s of player 1. We have:
V1 (A) = 40, V1 (B) = 30, V1 (C) = 50, V1 (D) = 30; the continuation utility of player 1 is thus
not single-peaked.
Example 8 (No MVE with innite number of shocks) Below is an example with nite
number of states and players and nite number of environments such that all assumptions,
except for the assumption that the number of shocks is nite, are satised, but there is no
Markov Voting Equilibrium in pure strategies.
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There are three environments E1; E2; E3, three states A = 1; B = 2; C = 3, and three players
1; 2; 3. The history of environments follows a simple Markov chain; in fact, in each period the
environment is drawn separately. More precisely,
 (E1) : =  (E1; E1) =  (E2; E1) =  (E3; E1) =
1
2
;
 (E2) : =  (E1; E2) =  (E2; E2) =  (E3; E2) =
2
5
;
 (E3) : =  (E1; E2) =  (E2; E3) =  (E3; E3) =
1
10
.
The discount factor is 12 .
The following matrices describe stage payo¤s, winning coalitions, and feasible transitions.
Environment E1 State A State B State C
Winning coalition Dictatorship of Player 1
Feasible transitions to A;B to B to C
Player 1 60 150  800
Player 2 30 130 60
Player 3  100 60 50
Environment E2 State A State B State C
Winning coalition Dictatorship of Player 2
Feasible transitions to A to A;B to C
Player 1 100 80  800
Player 2 80 70 60
Player 3  100 60 50
Environment E3 State A State B State C
Winning coalition Dictatorship of Player 3
Feasible transitions to A to B;C to C
Player 1 100 80  800
Player 2 80 70 60
Player 3  100 60 50
It is straightforward to see that Sincreasing di¤erences holds; moreover, payo¤s are single-peaked,
and in each environment and each state, the set of quasi-median voters is a singleton.
The intuition behind the example is the following. The payo¤ matrices in environment E2
and E3 coincide, so essentially, there are two equally likely environments E1 and E2 [ E3.
Both player 1 and 2 prefer state B when the environment is E2 and state A when the environment
is E1; given the payo¤ matrix and the discount factor, player 1 would prefer to move from A to
B when in E1, and knowing this, player 2 would be willing to move to A when in E2. However,
there is a chance that the environment becomes E3 rather than E2, in which case a maniac
player 3 will become able to move from state B (but not from A!) to state C; the reason for
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him to do so is that although he likes state B (in all environments), he strongly dislikes A, and
thus if players 1 and 2 are expected to move between these states, player 3 would rather lock
the society in state C, which is only slighly worse for him than B.
State C, however, is really hated by player 1, who would not risk the slightest chance of
getting there. So, if player 3 is expeced to move to C when given such chance, player 1 would
not move from A to B when the environment is E1, because player 3 is only able to move to C
from B. Now player 2, anticipating that if he decides to move from B to A when the environment
is E2, the society will end up in state A forever; this is something player 2 would like to avoid,
because state A is very bad for him when the environment is E1. In short, if player 3 is expected
to move to C when given this chance, then the logic of the previous paragraph breaks down, and
neither player 1 nor player 2 will be willing to move when they are in power. But in this case,
player 3 is better o¤ staying in state B even when given a chance to move to C, as he trades o¤
staying in B forever versus staying in C forever. These considerations should prove that there
is no MVE.
More formally, note that there are only eight candidate mappings to consider (some transi-
tions are made infeasible precisely to simplify the argument; alternatively, we could allow any
transitions and make player 1 the dictator in state A when the environment is E3). We consider
these eight mappings separately, and point out the deviation. Obviously, the only values of the
transition mappings to be specied are E1 (A), E2 (B), and E3 (B).
1. E1 (A) = A, E2 (B) = A, E3 (B) = B. Then 
0
E3 (B) = C is a protable deviation.
2. E1 (A) = B, E2 (B) = A, E3 (B) = B. Then 
0
E3 (B) = C is a protable deviation.
3. E1 (A) = A, E2 (B) = B, E3 (B) = B. Then 
0
E1 (A) = B is a protable deviation.
4. E1 (A) = B, E2 (B) = B, E3 (B) = B. Then 
0
E2 (B) = A is a protable deviation.
5. E1 (A) = A, E2 (B) = A, E3 (B) = C. Then 
0
E2 (B) = B is a protable deviation.
6. E1 (A) = B, E2 (B) = A, E3 (B) = C. Then 
0
E1 (A) = A is a protable deviation.
7. E1 (A) = A, E2 (B) = B, E3 (B) = C. Then 
0
E3 (B) = B is a protable deviation.
8. E1 (A) = B, E2 (B) = B, E3 (B) = C. Then 
0
E3 (B) = B is a protable deviation.
This proves that there is no MVE in pure strategies (i.e., in the sense of Denition 3).
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